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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMONit 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO:MP ANY OF NORTH 
. AMERICA 
vs. 
HETTIE I, .DAVIS' ADMINISTRATOR. 
To the Honorable Judges of th·e S~tp'teme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia.: 
Your petitioner, the Indemnity Insurance Company of 
North America, a corporation duly authorized to do busi-
_ness fu the State of Virginia, respectfully represents to your 
Honors that it is aggrieved by a judgment of the Corpora-
tion Court of the City of Danville, entered on February 10, 
1927, in the action at law brought against it by Hettie I. 
Davis' Ad.:ministrator~ hereinafter called the plaintiff, ~n 
which the plaintiff recovered against th.i.s Insurance Company 
for the amount of $4,623.03. A transcript of the record is 
:filed herewith, from which will appear the following facts: 
FACTS. 
The defendant, the Indemnity Insurance Company of North 
America, issues among other policies a standard automobile 
liability policy, and issued one to a man named M. M. Barker 
of Danville, Virginia, which policy ig in evidence (Exhibit 
Policy) insuring Barker against liability, for damage done by 
an Essex Roadster. In April, 1926, Barker, a married man, 
took a young woman named Hettie I. Davis, out riding in 
some automobile, what kind of automobile does not .appear 
in the evidence, and became involved jn an accident, in which 
the young woman lost her life, and Barker was slightly in~ 
j;ured. 
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Barker within the next few days cansed the Administrator 
to be informed that he had a liability policy with the defend-
ant company, and the company was notified by their local 
insurance soliciting agents that an aecident had happened 
and that Miss Davis' Administrator was inquiring about" 
collecting some damages, not out of Barker,. but from this. 
defendant Company. 
The Company promptly wrote Aiken and Benton, their 
local attorneys, to investigate the circumstances of the ac-
cident and report to them. 
An express condition of the policy itself is as follows: 
"The assured shall at all times remler to the Company all 
. co-operation and assistance in his power, and whenever re-
quested, shall aid in securing information and evidence, and 
the attendance of witnesses and in prosecuting appeals.'' 
Mr. Jesse W. Benton, acting as investigating attorney for 
the Company, immediately upon being notified by tile Com-
pany of the accident, tried to find out how it happened. He 
was informed that the only eye witnesses were Miss Davis, 
who was dead, and Barker, the assured. He several times 
called on Barker, the assured, to tell him about the facts 
and circumstances of the accident, but Barker flatly refused 
to make any statements about it, saying he had been advised 
by friends not to tell how the accident happened, and showing 
every indication of having some compelling personal reason 
for not desiring to make any statement. After making per-
sistent efforts to get Barker, the assured, to tell how the ac-
cident, happened, Benton reported to the Company that he· 
could get no co-operation and information from Barker, and 
accordingly, on July 27, 1926, the Company wrote Barker, dis-
claiming further liability on the policy on the grounds that 
he had failed to live up to the conditions of the policy, which 
required full co-operation. 
Suit was brought against Barker by Miss Davis' Admin=-
istrator, for her wrongful death, and tl1en in September, 1926, 
Barker came to see Benton and offered to make ·a statement, 
but was informed by Benton that the Company had disclaimed 
liability, and could not take it up again. The suit of Davis' 
Administrator vs. Barker came up for trial at the October, 
1926, term of the Corporation Court of Danville, and Barker, 
although he had a good defense, judging from his grounds or 
defense filed, declined to go through with trial, and agreed 
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that a verdict of $4,500.00'-an amount just within the $5,000.00 
policy-be entered against him. Then, although the undis-
puted evidence showed that Barker had considerable property 
of his own at the last tax assessment~ including $1,117.00 in 
cash, no serious effort was made to collect the $4,500.00 or 
any part of it from Barker, the plaintiff apparently being 
content with letting the Sergeant look at Barker's household 
chairs, piano, etc., then report him to be insolvent, and sue 
the insurance company. · 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
First Assignment of Error. 
Your petitioner submits that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to set aside the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff and 
enter :final judgment for the defendant. Your petitioner 
claims that the evidence does not su:;;;tain a verdict for the 
plaintiff, and the verdict should be set aside and :final judg-
ment entered for the defendant on the following grounds: 
(1) Your petitioner directs the Court's attention to the fact 
that the record shows that the plaintiff at the trial introduced 
IJO evidence to prove that the Essex Roadster that was in-
sured in the policy between the Company and Barker. was 
the automobile in which Barker aud Miss Davis were riding 
when the accident happened. By the express terms of the 
policy, the Company is liable only for damages done by this 
particular automobiie. Now here in the policy is there any-
thing to indicate that the Company undertook any responsi-
bility for any car that Barker might be driving or riding in. 
The evidence discloses the fact that Barker had two auto-
mobiles. It might have been either one of them, or it might 
have been a borrowed or hired car that caused this damage. 
The burden was upon the plaintiff to show that the car in-
sured was the one that caused the damage. The plaintiff 
positively did not offer any proof on this point, and it is 
submitted that the absence of proof on this point alone makes 
the evidence insufficient to sustain a verdict against this 
Company. 
The plaintiff apparently relied on the letter of G. I. Sweitzer 
of July 27, 1926, to take the place of proof that the insured 
Essex Roadster did the damage, but it is obvious upon a mo-
ment's thought that this letter could not possibly be proof on 
this point. All this letter can possibly be made to mean is 
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that a cla!im, having been asserted .ttgainst the Company ·for 
damage by this car, the Company denies the claim. To claim 
is one thing, and to prove is another. rrhis letter of Sweitzer's 
could not by any means relieve the plaintiff of the burden of 
• proving that the insured Essex Roadster caused the damage 
as an essential element of his case. Then, too1 Sweitzer was 
in Philadelphia at the time of the accident and could not pos- · 
sibly testify as to what ~ar Miss Davis met .her death in. 
Sweitzer testified to this effect very positively at the trial, 
and stated that he did not know whether the car that caused 
the damage was the Essex Roadster insured. in the policy or 
not, and notwithstanding this, still the plaintiff· brought forth 
no evidence. 
It is again submitted that no verdict against this defend-
ant "Company can properly be sustained in the· absence of 
one of the most essential elements of its liability. 
(2) This is not all, however. There are other reasons why 
the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict for the 
plaintiff. The uncontradicted evidence shows that Barker, 
the assured, wilfully refused and failed to co-operate with 
this Company, and refused· to give it information as to how 
the accident happened, plainly in violation of the conditions · 
of the policy, thereby putting this Company in such a posi-
tion that it could not know how to defend suit1 or whether it 
would be advisable to stand trial or try to settle the claim 
out of Court. BARKER ADMITTED HIMSELF THAT 
HE WOULD NOT TELL THE COMPANY HOW IT HAP-
PENED, BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ADVISED NOT TO 
DO SO. It was very apparent that Barket had very com-
pelling personal motive for k;eeping quiet. One of the. ex-
. pressed conditions of the policy is to the effect that "The as-
sured shall at all times render to the Company all co-operation 
and assistance in his power, and whenever requested, aid in 
securing information * * * . " 
Barker, on the witness stand, admitted he violated th1s 
condition, and this conduct of the assured relieved the Com-
pany of any further liability. See the following authorities: 
41 A. L. R. 523 (Ann. 8). 
Schoenfeld vs. New Jersey Fid., etc., Ins. Co., 203 App. Div. 
796, 197 N. Y, S'upp. 607. . 
U. S. Fidelity & G. Go. vs. William.~, 129 Atl. 660. 
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'This doctrine is also recognized by inference in Fentress 
vs. Rutledge1 140 Va. 685, 12.5 S. E. 668. 
The case of Cole·man vs. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 213. 
N. Y. Supp. is also very pertinent. In that case defendant in-
sured the Endicott Drug Store; Inc., ''against loss from the 
liability * * * as the result of any error * * * in the filling of 
any prescription". Plaintiff recovered judgment against the 
assured for such an injury, and, after return of execution un-
satisfied (the assured being bankrupt), sues under Insurance 
Law, Section 109 (see McKinney's Consol. Laws and S'upp.), 
providing that bankruptcy of the assured "shall not release 
the insurance carrier from payment of damages", etc .. 
The defense urged was a failure to co-operate. 
The trial court left to the jury the question whether the 
assured had failed. to co.:.operate, and the jury, by rendering 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, answered that there· had 
been no material breach by the assnred in this respect. In 
granting defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, the court 
said: · 
''The assured supplied the insurer with but the one fact 
that a mistake had occurred. With this meagre information, 
the insurer might be justified in. conclading that some liability 
in fact existed, but it had to s.peculate as to the extent of the · 
liability. Its ability to contes.t the amount of the damages. on 
the inquest was impaired by the refusal to give information 
·as to the nature of the mis.take. Defendant could not prop-
erly determine whether to res.is.t or settle the claim, or liti-
gate the amount of the damage.'' 
{3) Your petitioner als.o submits that there was collusion 
between Barker, the assured, and the plaintiff, for the pur-
pose of exploiting the_ defendant Company in damages, and 
that this defeats the right of the plaintiff to recover of the 
defendant, and furnis.hes an additional reason why the ver-
dict should be set aside. 
Roth vs. National Auto. Mutual Casualty· Co., 195 N. Y. 
Supp. 865. 
Your petitioner feels that the evidence about collusion may 
fairly be stated to show as follows: 
That immediately·after Miss Davis' death, Barker, the as-· 
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s.ured instigated and invited litigation against himself by sPncl-
ing a message to Covington, Miss Davis' employer, who quali-
fied as Administrator, to the effect that he had this insurance 
policy with the defendant Company. It is not apparent how 
the plaintiff would have found out abJut it otherwise. This 
showed a very __ eaxly desire to co-operate with and placate 
the deceased's people, rather than to co-operate with and pro-
tect the defendant Company. Another significant thing just 
about this time was the fact that the plaintiff, in talking to-
au agent of the defendant, stated that he had no idea of bring-
ing suit. This would certainly seem to indi~ate that the cir-
cumstances of the accident (as known to the plaintiff) would 
-not justify trying to hold Barker responsible for it. Then 
came Barker's stubborn and persistent refusal to acquaint the 
defendant Company with how it all happened, which is a very 
suspicious circum,stance. Then came added confidence in the 
outcome of the suit by the plaintiff against Barker, which re-
sulted in a suit for Ten Thousand Dollars damages for the· 
wrongful death of Miss Davis. When this action comes up 
for trial, Barker, apparently with an absolute defense, judg-
ing from the grounds of defense filed, decides not to go tO' 
trial, and consents to a verdict against him for the amount· 
of Forty Five Hundred Dollars and eoBts (the amount of the 
policy is Five Thousand Dollars, and Barker claims to be-
insolvent, and it is very evident that he did net expect to pay 
it). 
Now, under the Code, Section 4326A, another little bridge 
has to be crossed before the Insurance Company can be 
reached. It must be shown that this ,indgment cannot be col-
lected out of Barker, because he was insolvent. Barker, the· 
evidence shows, is a building contractor, able to finance his ' 
work, owning real estate, two automobiles, and a considerable 
bank balance at the last tax assessment date. What pffort 
did the plaintiff make to collect its jndgmeut out of Barker'? 
It sent the aged City Sergeant to his home, and he questioned 
Mrs. Barker about the ownership of the chairs, piano, etc., 
and at once made the very unusual return on the execution. 
No attempt to collect from Barker's bank account, or to levy 
on his two automobiles or to subject his real estate to the 
payment of the judgment was made. In short, it is most evi-
dent that the plaintiff did not want to rolleet this money from 
Barker, and made no serious effort to do so .. 
We realize that the argument will naturally be advanced 
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that all these circumstances about collusion were questions of 
fact for the jury, and settled in favor of the plaintiff by the 
jury's verdict. We cannot agree to this theory. The jury 
is presumed to have a reasonable amount of intelligence, and 
we respectfully submit that the combination of all the cir- · 
cumstances from the day after the accident on down, make 
the necessary inference apparent to any reasonably intelligent 
person that Barker, the assured, and the plaintiff were work-
ing together in complete accord, with an understanding that 
if Barker would help the plaintiff get to the Insurance Com-
. pany, the plaintiff would not require Barker to pay the judg-
ment; that the Insurance Company afforded legitimate prey 
for both Barker and the plaintiff to feast upon. The plain-
tiff could feast on the Insurance Company by collecting $4,-
500.00 he is not entitled to, and Barker would feast upon it 
by withholding information from the Insurance Company so 
that they cannot fight the plaintiff, whom he is seeking to aid 
for reasons of his own, and getting money from the Company 
that he ought to pay, if any one should, paid by the Com-
pany. May we again say that no reasonably intelligent jury 
could escape this necessary inference ap.d conclusion. 
Second Assignment of Etror. 
The trial Court erred in refusing ~o give instruction No. 
Five, requested by the defenJant. This instruction presented 
squarely to the Court the question of subrogation under Sec-
tion 4326A of the Code, under which this action was brought. 
The defendant tookthe position that this was a simple matter 
of subrogation; that the plaintiff must stand right in Barker's 
shoes, and has no claim against the defendant superior to the 
claim of Barker against it, and that if Barker had so breached 
the conditions of the policy as to render him unable to come 
against the defendant Company, then the plaintiff, Barker's 
creditor, was unable to recover. 
The plaintiff took the position that there was no subroga-
tion about it; that the defendant Company was liable as soon 
as an accident happened, if Barker was insolvent, no matt:~r 
how much Barker breached the condition of the policy, never-
theless the Insurance Company was liable to Barker's credi-
tor. 
., 
This Section of the Code, adopted in 1924, reads as fol-
lows: 
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"4326a. Third person injured by a party carrying in-
demnity insurance subrogated to rights of such party.-No 
policy of insurance against loss or damage resulting ~rom ac-
cident to or injury ::mffered by an employee or other person 
and for which the person insured is liable, or, against loss or 
damage to property caused by animals or by any vehicle 
drawn, propelled, or operated by any motive power, and for 
which loss or damage the person insured is liable, shall be 
issued or delivered (to any person} in this State by any cor-
poration or other insurer authorized tu do business in this 
State, unless there shall be contained within such policy a . 
provision that the ~nsolvency or bankruptcy of the person in-
sured shall not release the insurance carrier from the pay-
ment of damages for injuries sustained or loss occasioned 
during the life of such policy, and stating that in case execu-
tion agaip.st the insured is returned unsatisfied in an action 
brought by the injured person, or hi'3 or her personal repre-
sentative in case death results from the aecident, because of 
such insolvency or bankruptcy, (that) then an action may be 
maintained by the injured person, •>"i' his or her personal 
representative, again~:~t such corporation under the terms of 
the policy fo.r the amount of the judgment in said action, not 
exceeding the amount of the policy. (1924, p. 504.)" 
This policy complies with the Section above quoted, but it 
· is submitted that this does not eliminde other parts of the 
contract contained in the policy and does not relieve the as-
sured of the obligation to comply with the parts of the policy 
that he undertakes to comply with and that the Insurance 
Company is not liable except on its contract which must be 
complied with. To hold ·that this is not a case of subrogation, 
and that an Insurance Company is liable, whether or not the 
conditions of its policy are complied with will throw the doors 
wide open to the worst )rind of fraud ~nd oppression against 
Insurance Companies. A person insured in a policy could 
get into an accident, for which he was not at all to blame, in-
vite litigation against himself, refuse to give the insurance 
company any information, etc., or even refuse to notify the 
Company, and then the Insurance Company would have to 
pay any judgment that might be obtained against the assured 
under such circumstances as these. This would be the in-
evitable result, if the law were established to he what the 
plaintiff contends for. It will also be observed that the word 
''subrogated'' is used in the title to this section of the Code 
itself. The Court's attention is respeetfully called to the case 
----, --------
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of Fentress vs. Rutledge, 125 S. E. 668, which although not 
exactly like the case at bar, indicates plainly our own ,Vir-
ginia Court considers this a matter of subrogation of the 
rights of creditor to the assets of debtor. See also Schoenfeld 
vs. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass .Insu,ranoe Company, 
197 N. Y. Supp. 606. It plainly holds that this is merely a 
question of subrogation of the rights of a creditor to the as-
sets of a debtor. 
Your petitioner submits that the re.fusal of the trial Oourt 
to give this instruction was error very highly prejudicial 
to it. 
Third Assignment of Error. 
The trial court erred in refusing to. give instruction Num-
ber Four, requested by the defendant. This instruction is 
based directly on the language of the policy and. if the de-: 
fendant Company is correct in its position that it cannot be 
lleld liable on this action except through its contract, then this 
instruction should certainly -have been given. In other words, 
if there is anything whatsoever in the subrogation theory held 
by the defendant, this instruction is entirely proper and es-
sential for proper understanding of the case by the jury. . · 
Fourth Assignment of Error. 
The trial Court erred in refusing to give instructions Num-
. bers Six and §.e..ven requested by the defendant. These in-
structions are -based upon the language of the policy. 
Fifth Assignment of Error. 
The trial Court erred in refusing to give h!struction Num-
ber Eight requested by the defendant. This instruction deals 
with the question of burden of proof and it is submitted that 
it is proper and should have been given. 
Sixth Assignment of Error. 
The trial Court erred in giving instruction "B" given by 
the Court over the objection of the defendant The defendant 
submits that this instruction, besides incorrectly stating the 
law, is entirely without evidence to support it. As already 
pointed out, there is an utter lack of proof in the entire record 
-
\ 
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that Miss Davis was killed as a result of an accident while 
in the Essex Roadster mentioned in the pqlicy. Such proof 
is es·sential for the giving of this instruction. It has already 
been pointed out in the earlier parts of this petition that it is 
an undisputed fact, admitted by Barker himselfr that he did 
not, when requested by Benton, give all the co-operation and 
assistance in his power, and therefore the record is entirely 
without any evidence to justify the giving of. this instruction 
in this particular. 
This instruction also does not state the law correctly. It 
fails to take into consideration the question of collusion be-
tween Barker and the plaintiff. 
It is submitted that this instruction is highly erroneous 
and prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. 
Seventh Assignment of Error. 
The trial Court c rred in giving Instruction "C" requested 
by the plaintiff, and given over the objection of the defend-
ant. This instruction does not state the law correctly. No 
matter if the Company has disclaimed liability, Barker does 
not have the right to do anything he wants to thereafter, when 
he does not acquiesce in the disclaimer, and then attempt to 
hold the Company liable for it. It is submitted that the Com-
pany waives nothing and does not deprive itself of its defense 
by disclaiming liability for the breaeh of a condition. 
Your petitioner therefore prays that to the judgment afore-
said, a writ of error and s~tpersedeas may be awarded, with 
Buch bond as the Court deems prop·~r; that said judgment 
may be reviewed, reversed and aiinnlJed; that final judgment 
- may be entered in this Court in favor of your petitioner, and 
that it may have such further relief as is proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTI-I AMERICA. 
By AIKEN & RENTON, Counsel. . 
I, A.M. Aiken, an attorney practicing· in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby cm:t1fy that in my opinion 
the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition is er-
roneous, and should be reviewed and re,·ersed, and that the 
------- -~~ -- -- ~ 
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relief prayed for in the petition should be granted to your 
petitioner. · 
Given under my hand March 31, .t927. 
A.M. AIKEN. 
Received April 1, 1927. 
J. F. W. 
Writ of error allowed, and superaedeas awarded. Bond · 
$6,000.00. 
JESSE li'. WEST. 
April18, 1927. 
Received April 20, 1927. 
H. S. J. 
VIRGlNIA: 
Pleas before the Judge of the Corporation Court of Dan· 
ville, on the lOth day of February, 1927. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, io-wit: On the 5th day 
of November, 1926, came John A. Covington, Administrator 
of Hettie I. Davis, deceased, by his .Attorneys, and filed in ~--­
the Clerk's Office of said Court his Notice to recover judg..: 
ment against Indemnity Insurance Company of North 
America, Philadelphia, a corporation duly l'hartered, which 
Notice is in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
"NOTICE." 
Notice is hereby given by John A. Covington, Administra-
tor of Hettie I. Davis, deceased, plaintiff, to Indemnity In-
surance Company of North America, Philadelphia, a corpo-
ration duly chartered, defendant, that said plaintiff will on 
Monday, the 6th day of December; 1926, or as soon thereafter 
as his counsel may be heard, move the Corporation Court of 
Danville, Virginia, for a judgment against said defendant for 
the sum of Forty-:five Hundred Dollars ($4~500.00) with in-
terest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 7th day of 
October, 1926, until paid, and $33.03 court costs, recovered 
by said plaintiff in an action in said court against Marion 
M. Barker, hereinafter referred to. 
As a basis for said motion plaintiff says that heretofore, 
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to-wit, on the .......... day of February, 1926, the said de-· 
fendant entered into a certain contract with, and issued its 
certain policy of liability insurance to Marion M. Barker, a 
carpenter residing on Keen Street in the city of Danville, 
Virginia, whereby said defendant covenanted and agreed dur-
ing the period of 12 months from the date of the issue of said 
policy thence next ensuing, to pay not exceeding Five Thou-
sand Dollars ($5,000.00) on account of" loss by reason of the 
. liability imposed by law upon said Marion M. Barker for 
bodily injuries or for death resulting from such bodily in-
juries suffered .by any person during the term of said policy, 
and resulting from the ownership, maintenance and 
page -2 ~ use by the said Marion M. Barker of a certain Essex 
Roadster, 1925 year model, and further by said 
policy agreed to pay all court costs taxed against the said 
Marion M. Barker in any suit against said Marion M. Barker, 
brought to enforce such liability, and further agreed to pay 
all interest accruing upon any judgment in any such suit up 
to the date of the payment thereof. _ 
. And said plaintiff further avers that under the terms of 
said policy and under the statute of Virginia in such cases 
made and provided, the insolvency or bankruptcy of said 
Marion M. Barker does not operate to release said defendant 
from the payment of damages for injuries sustained or loss 
occasioned during the life of said policy: 
And plaintiff further avers that under the terms of said 
policy and under such statute it is agreed and provided that 
in case execution against said Marion M. Barker is returned 
unsatisfied in an action brought by a person injured in the use 
and operation of his said automobile, or by the personal rep-
resentative of such person in case l1is or her death results 
from such accident, because of such insolvency or bankruptcy, 
that in such event an action may be maintained by such in-
sured person or by his <?r her personal representative against 
said defendant under the terms of such policy for the amount 
of the judgment in said action, provided the same does not 
exceed the amount of liability under .mch policy. . 
And the said plaintiff further avers that while said policy 
of liability insurance was in full force and offect, to-wit, on 
the 5th day of April, 19:26, the said Marion M. Barker be-
came liable to said John A. Covington, Administrator of Het-
tie I. Dav~s, for the wrongful death of said Hettie I. Davis, 
resulting from the ownership, maintenance and use of the 
Essex Roadster owned by said Marion M.- Barker and cov-
ered by the policy aforesaid, and thereupon) to-wit, on said 
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.5th day of April, 1926, liability for such accident and death 
attached to you, the said defendant, Indemnity Insurance Com-
pany of North America, Philadelphia, as such in-
page 3 ~ surer. 
And the said plaintiff further avers that on the 
12th day of August, 1926, as such administrator of Hettie I. 
Davis, he instituted his action by way of notice of motion for 
judgment against said Marion M. Barker in the Corporation 
Court of Danville to reeover $10,000.00 damages against said 
Marion M. Barker for the wrongful death of said Hettie I. 
Davis, and at a later date, to-wit, on the 7th day of October, 
1926, said plaintiff for the cause of action aforesaid recovered 
in, said court a judgment against the ~aid defendant, Marion 
M. Barker, for the sum of $4,500.00, the amount of damages 
by the jurors in their verdict ascertained, with interest there-
on at 6 per cent per annu~ from October 7, 1926, until paid, 
and the costs of court by said plaintiff in said action expended, 
the amount of said costs aggregating $33.03 as hereinbefore 
set out. 
Said plaintiff further avers that, to-wit, on the ........ day 
of October, 1926~ an execution or writ of fieri facias was sued 
out of the clerk's office of said Corporation Court of Dan-
ville on the judgment aforesaid, against Marion M. Barker, 
whereby the sergeant of the City of Danville was directed to 
make and collect the amount of the judgment for $4,500.00, 
with interest and $33.03 costs, out of 1he goods and chattels 
of said Marion M. Barker, and said sPrgeant was further re-
quired to make return of said execution on the 1st day of 
November term of court, 1926, to-wit, on the 1st day of No-
vember, 1926. 
And plaintiff further avers that on said 1st day of Novem- · 
her, 1926, the sergeant of the City of Danville returned said 
execution as unsatisfied, said return endorsed on said execu-
tion being in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
''The money herein mentioned cannot be made. 
Execution debtor is insolvent. 
P. H. BOISSEAU, 
Sergean.t City of Danville.'' 
And said plaintiff further avers that by reason whereof th; 
said plaintiff hath a right to have and recover of the said 
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defendant the amount of said judgment, interest and costs S() 
recovered by this plaintiff against the said defendant, Ma-
rion M. Barker, and accordingly notice is given of this motion 
to recover of .you, the said defendant, the sum of 
page 4 ~ Forty-five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) with inter-
est from October 7, 1926', until paid, and in addition 
$33.03 costs of said judgment. 
JOHN A. COVINGTON, 
Administrator of Hettie I. Davis, Deceased. 
By Counsel. 
HARRIS, HARVEY & BROWN, p. q. 
"RETURN ON NOTICE." 
Executed in the City of Richmond, Va., Nov. 4th, 1926, by 
delivering in duplicate a copy of within notice to B. 0. James~ 
the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia and as such 
Secretary of the Commonwealth the Statutory Agent for In-
demnity Insurance Company of North·Ameriea, Philadelphia1 
a corporation duly chartered, defendant. 
Place of residence and place of husiness of said B. 0. 
James being in the City of Richmond, V a. Fee of $2.50 paid 
the Secretary at time of service. Sergeant's Fee $ .50. 
JOHN G. SAUNDERS, 
Sergeant of Richmond, V a. 
By J. H. FLOYD, 
Deputy Sergeant. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Corporation Court of 
Danville, held at the Court-house thereof. on the 7th day of 
December, 1926. 
This day came the plaintiff by his attorney, and it appear-
ing by affidavit of the said plaintiff Lhat there is in the pos-
session of Harry Wooding, Jr., Atto1·ney for M. M. Barker, 
the following writings or· documents, to-wit: 
A policy of liability insurance issued by the above named 
defendant to Marion M. Barker on the ....... day of Febru-
ary, 1926, covering injuries or death arising out of the use 
• 
• 
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.and operation of a certain Essex automobile, and a certain 
other writing, to-wit: 
One or more letters from the above named defendant to 
M. M. Barker, whereby and wherein the above named defend-
ant refuses to comply with the terms of the above policy of 
liability insurance, and th~1t f:he said Harry Wood-
page 5 ~ ing, Jr., is not a party to the matter here in contro-
versy, and that the said writings and documents 
are material and should be ordered to be produced before this 
Court. 
It is, therefore, ordered that the CJerk of this Court issue 
a subpoena duces tecum to compel the said Harry Wooding, 
.Jr., Attorney for M. M. Barker, to produce the said writings 
before this Court at the court-room thereof on the 9th day 
of December, 1926, at 10 o'clock .A.. M. 
And at another day, to-wit: At the same Court continued 
and held at the Court-house thereof, on the 9th day of De-
cember, 1926. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and on motion 
of the plaintiff, it is ordered that th9 defendant file a state-
ment of its grounds of defense relied on in this cause, which 
is accordingly filed. Thereupon the said defendant saith that 
it did not undertake or promise in manner and form as in 
the plaintiff's Notice against it is alleged and of this it puts 
itself upon the Country, and the p~aintiff doth the like. 
Whereupon came a jury, to-wit: .T. A. Alverson, Geo. K. 
Bruce, Wm. E. Bennett, Herman A. Il'eldman, W. T. Davis, 
W. N. Baisey, & .Plumer Wiseman, who being elected tried 
and sworn according to law, well and truly to try the issue 
joined, and having heard the evidence in full and argument 
of counsel, were sent out of Court to consult of their verdict, 
and after some time returned, declaring that they could not 
a,gree upon a verdict, thereupon by consent of parties and 
with the assent of the Court, J. A. Alverson, one of the jurors 
aforesaid, was withdrawn and the rest of the jury from ren-. 
dering their verdict discharged. And it is ordered that this 
cause be continued till February Court next. 
''GROUNDS OF DEFENSE.'' 
This defendant will rely on the following grounds of de-
fense: 
• 
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( 1) That it is in no way liable to the plaintiff for the amount 
claimed in his notice or for any other amount. 
page 6 ~ (2) That the plaintiff can claim only through M. 
M. Barker, and that the said M. M" Bar~er violated 
. the conditions of the policy he had with this Company by 
failure to co-operate with this Company in preparing for any 
defense of action and refused to give this Company's repre-
sentative any information about the 0ircumst:mces of the ac-
cident, when requested to do so, and disclaimed all liability 
under the policy. 
(3) That the judgment against the said Barker was not ob-
tained as the result of a trial upon which· Barker's liability 
· was adjudicated, upon its merits, but as the result of an agreed 
verdict, without the taking of any evidence, without the dis-
closing of liability, wherein the said Barker colluded with the 
plaintiff to obtain judgment against him, recognizing the fact 
that he would not pay the same himself . 
. (4) That the judgment against Barker was voluntarily as-
sumed and incurred and allowed by ~'lj_m, without the ·written 
consent of this defendant, in violation of the conditions of 
the policy. 
( 5) This defendant will also rely npon any grounds of de-
fense which may be taken advantage of under the general is-
sue. 
Respectfully, 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA. 
By A.M. AIKEN, Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Corporation Court o-f 
Danville, held at the Court house thereof, on the 7th day of 
February, 1927. 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys, there-
upon came a jury, to-wit: Edwin H. Bagland, Wm K. Ruffin, 
Clifton H. ·R.eese, P. E. Scism, J as. P. Eskildson, E. T. Estes, 
and Seth Taylor, who being elected tried ana sworn accord-
ing to law, well and truly to try the :.ssue joined, and having 
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· heard the evidence in full,. were by consent of parties and 
with the assent of the Court adjourned till tomorrow· morn-
ing at 10 o'clock. 
And at another day, to-wit: At the same Court continued 
and held at the Court house thereof, on the 8th day of Feb-
ruary, 19·27. 
page 7 } This day came again the parties by their Attor-
neys, and the jury sworn i.n this cause appeared in 
Court according to their adjom:nment on yesterday, and hav-
ing heard the argument of counsel, were sent out of Court to 
consult of their verdict, and after some time returned, and 
upon their oath do say: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff 
this action and fix the amount of damages $4,500.00 plus in-
terest from Oct. 7th, 1926, to Feby. 7th) 1927, $90.00 and 
cost $33.03." 
Whereupon. the said defendant moved the Court to set aside 
said verdict and enter final judgment in its favor, or to grant 
it a new trial, on the grounds that the same is contrary to the 
law and the evidence and without evidence to support it, and 
the Court takes time to consider tl!ereof. 
And now at this day, to-wit: At the same Court continued 
and held at the· Court house thereof, on the loth day of Feb-
ruary, 1927, 1?-eing the day and year first herein mentioned. 
This day came again as well the plaintiff as the defend-
ant by their Attorneys, and the Court having maturely con-
. side red the defendant's motion to se~ aside the verdict ren-· 
dered in this cause against it, and to enter final judgment in 
its favor, or to grant it a new trial, doth overrule the same. 
Therefore, it is considered by the Court that the plaintiff 
recover against the said defendant Forty-six hundred and 
twenty-three dollars and three cents ($4,623.03), his damages, 
interest and costs, by the jurors in th(!ir verdict ascertained, 
with interest thereon at six per cent per annum from today, 
to-wit: the lOth day of February, 1927, till paid, and his costs 
by him about his notice in this behalf expended. 
To which action of the Court in refusing to set aside said 
verdict and to enter final judgment for the defendant herein, 
or to grant it a new trial in said canse, and in entering up 
• 
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judgment on said verdict against .it, the said defendant, by 
counsel excepts. 
And the said defendant intimating to the Court 
page 8 ~ its intention to apply to the Supreme Uourt of Ap-
peals of Virginia, for a wr.i.t of error and supe·r-
sedea.s to th.e judgment aforesaid, it is ordered that the same 
be suspended for sixty days, upon condition that the plaintiff 
or some one for it, execute hefore the Clerk of this Court, 
Bond with approved security, in the penalty of $5,000.00, 
within 10 days from the adjournment of this Court. 
"NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR CER1'IFICATES' OF 
EXCEPTIONS." 
To J. A. Covington, Administrator of Hettie I. Davis, De-
ceased: 
Please take notice that on March 22, 1927, at ten A. M., or 
as soon thereafter as eounsel may be heard, at the Court 
House in Charlottesville, Virginia, we E:hall tender Judge A. 
D. Dabney the certificateE of exceptions for hiE siguatun,, 
March 21, 1927. 
Respectfully, 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA. 
By AIKEN & BENTON, Attorneys. 
Legal Service Accepted. 
Mch. 21, 1927. 
HARRIS, HARVEY & BROWN. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that Barker failed to render to the representatives 
of the defendant all co-operation and assistance in his power, · 
and failed to aid in securing information about the details 
of the accident when requested to make a statement about 
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the same and give information to a representative 
page 9 ~ of the Company, then the plaintiff cannot recover in 
this action and they should find for the defendant. 
The foregoing instruction requested by the defendant was 
denied, and the defendant excepted. 
Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge.· 
CERTIFICA~E OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
The Court instructs the jury that there is no contract be~ 
tween the plaintiff and defendant in this action, and that the 
plaintiff, in order to recover from the defendant, must be. 
subrogated or substituted to Barker's claim against the de-
fendant and stand in Barker's shoes, and that there can be 
no recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant, unless 
under the evidence disclosed before you Barker himself could 
recover against this defendant. 
The foregoing instruction request~:Jd by the defendant was 
deniedr and the defendant excepted. 
Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge. 
CERTIFICATE OF E·XGEPTION NO. 3. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that Barker colluded with the plaintiff to permit 
him to obtain a verdict against him, or voluntarily assumed 
the liability of this verdict, then neither the plaintiff nor 
Barker have any just claim against this defendant and their 
verdict should be for the defendant. 
The foregoing instruction requested by the defendant was 
denied, and the defendant excepted. 
Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge. 
2'0 Suprelne Court of Appeals· of Virginia. 
page 10. ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 4. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 7 .. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe that the 
judgment against Barker was secured with Barke.r 's consent, 
and covered or included any expenses other than those for 
immediate surgical relief, and further believe that the de-
fendant Company gave no written co:nsent to the incurring 
of any part of this judgment that was not for immediate sur-
gical relief, the defendant is not liable in this action and 
they should find for the defendant. 
The foregoing instruction requested by the defendant was 
denied, and the defendant excepted. 
Teste : March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DAB.NEY, Judge . 
. ,. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 5. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
The Court instructs the jury that the burden is upon the 
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence; to the 
satisfaction of the jury, that Barker complied with all the con-
ditions in the policy, before he can r~cover of the defendant 
in this action. · 
The foregoing instruction requested by tpe defendant was 
denied, and the defendant excepted. 
· Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge. 
r~,. ,., .. 
, . . . . CERTIFICATE. OF EXCEPTION NO. 6. 
r- , 
I ;.._.;;; 
INSTRUCTION "A" (Refused). 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
preponderance of the evidence in this case that the defend-
ant insurance company insured Marion Barker's.automobile 
in accordance with a written policy, hitrodueed in evidence 
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and that on April 5, 1926, Hettie J. Davis. lost her 
page 11 } life as a result of an accident in the operation or 
control of said automobile; that John A. Coving-
ton, the qualified administrator of Hettie I. Davis obtained 
in the Corporation Court of Danville a judgment against 
Marion Barker for $4,500.00 on account of the death of the 
said Hettie I. Davis; that execution issued on said judgment 
was returned by P. H. Boisseau, Sergeant of the City of 
Danville unsatisfied and that the amount of the judgment 
could not be collected because Marion Barker was insolvent, 
then, under the law, Covington, administrator, plaintiff in 
this action, is entitled to judgment against the defendant in-
surance company and the jury should so find and should fix 
the damages at $4,500.00 with interest from the 7th day of 
October, 1926, plus $33.03 costs. 
'The foregoing. instruction, requested by thE> plaintiff, was 
refused and plaintiff excepted. 
'Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY,' Judge. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 7. 
INSTRUCTION "B',· 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
preponderance of the evidence in this case that the defendant 
insured Marion Barker in accordance with the policy intro- . 
duced in evidence; that on the 5th day of April, 1926, Hettie 
I. Davis, while in the Essex Roadster mentioned in the policy, 
was killed as result of an accident in the use of said automo-
bile; that the insurance company was promptly notified of said 
accident and that Barker up to July 27th, 1926, the date the 
letter from the insurance company denying liability was re-
ceived, at all times rendered to the ~ompany all co-operation 
and assistance in his power and, whenever requested aided in 
securing information and evidence and the attendance of wit-
nesses; that after the insurance company notified Barker of 
its refusal to defend or recognize any liability un-
page 12 } der the policy, an action was instituted against 
Barker by John Covington, qualified administra-
tor of Hettie I, Davis at the October term of the Court and 
judgment against Barker was obtained for $4,500.00 for dam-
·"' 
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ages on ·account of said accident and nxecution on this judg-
ment was returned unsatisfied. and tliat'the. amount of said 
judgment .could not be collected beca,1se of the insolvency of 
.Barker, then the jury should find for the plaintiff in this 
action and fix the amount of. the damages. as .$4,500.00 plu~. 
interest from ·October 7, .1926, ·.to Feb. 7; 1927, $90.00 plus: 
$33.03 costs. And this is true r.egardless of .whether judg..; 
ment against Barker was entered against him by consent as 
a· compromise upon advice of his· counsel .or not,. unless the 
jury believe such judgment was "Secnred oby fraudulent col-
lusion between Barker and· the ·plaintiff. 
\ 
The foregoing instruction was given· by the court of its· 
own. motion and the plaintiff excepted on the ground that 
fraud was not properly in issue before the jury in this case, 
there being no evidence in tlie case sh<mting "Or t~nding to show 
fraud; and further, that lack of co-Operation on the part of 
Barker is not a defense to this action ::!.S to the plaintiff, Cov-
ington. Defendant also excepted on the ground that there 
was no evidence to support the instruction and because it was 
not the law. · · 
Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge .. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 8. 
. . . 
INSTRUCTION "C, (as offered). 
The Court further instructs the jury that the condition of 
the policy that'it shall not cover any liability voluntarily as-
sumed by the assured, beund Barker to comply with this pro-
vision so as not to· interfere with or preclude defendant from' . 
controlling the· settlement or defenHa ·of any claim or suit 
against Barker growing out of th0 use of his said 
page 13 ~ automobile. This clause was intended for the pro"' 
tection of the defendant company and was binding 
on Barker so long as the defendant company recognized 
Barker as the assured under said policy as to the Davis ac-
cident. The court further tells the jury, however, that this 
provision of the policy may be waived by the defendant com..: 
pany so as not thereafter to be binding on Barker. 
· · Th~ Court further tells the jury that if they believe from: 
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the' evidence that the defendant company on July 27, 1926, 
disclaimed liability under' said policy for the fatai.accident to~ 
Hettie I. Davis such disclaimer operated as a waiver of the 
:above condition <>f .said policy so as not to bind- .8ai'ker to- a 
compliance therewith after July- 27, 1926. The .j'ury ar.es 
therefore, not to inquire _ whether :·he judgm_ent- r-ecovered 
by Covington, Administrator, against Barker was based on 
.a verdict entered by Barker's consent. 
. The foregoing instruction was requested by the plaintiff 
and refused by the court, to which action of the court the 
plaintiff excepted, whereupon the court amended the above 
· instruction so as to read as follows : · · 
INSTRUCTION "C'~ (as .given).- . 
The Court further instructs the jury that the condition of 
the policy that it shall not cover a:ily liability voluntarily as· 
:sumed by the assured, bound Barker to comply with this pro-
vision so as not to interfere with or preclude defendant froni 
controlling the .settlement or defense of any. cl-aitn or suit 
against Barker growing out of the use of his said automobile. 
This clause was infended for the protecti01i of the defendant 
company and was binding on Barker so long as the defend· 
:ant company recognized Barker as the assured under said 
policy as to the Davis accident. The court further tells the 
jury, however, that this provision of the policy may be waived 
by the defendm1t compai1y so as not thereafter to be binding 
on Barker. 
The Court further tells the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the defendant company on July 27, 1926, 
disclaimed liability under said policy for the fatal accident in 
Hettie- I. Davis such disclaimer oper·ated as a 
page 14 ~ waiver of the above condition of said policy so as 
not to bind Barker to a compliance therewith after 
July 27, 1926. The jury,a.re, therefore, not to inquire whether 
the judgment recovered by Covington, Adm'inistrator, against 
Barker was based on a verdict entered by Barker's consent, if 
done in good faith, acting on advice of counsel employed by 
him. - · 
The foregoing amended instructfon \vas given by tne. court 
and the defendant excepted on the grounds that it is not sup-
ported by the evidence and generally ns not being the !aw. Th~ 
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plaintiff excepted to the amendment on the ground that good 
faith or fraud was not in issue before the jury. 
Teste : March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 9. 
On the trial of this case the defendant asked the witness~ 
Covington, the following questions in reference "to Buit of 
Hettie I. Davis's Administrator v. Marion M. Barker, in 
which judgment was obtained~ 
''·Q. You spoke about the trial you !1ad up here. You said 
you never did talk to Mr. Barker about this case? 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. You brought suit for $10,000 and settled it up here for 
$4,500. You. did that-how did you work that without talking 
to Mr. Barkerf 
A. How- did we do that without talking to Mr. Barker¥ 
Q. Yes. . 
A. That was worked thru the counsel. I discussed it with 
Mr. Harris and Brown. ' 
Q. Harris and Brown represented you Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You agreed on $4,500Y 
A. Yes.· 
Q. Who was representing Mr. BarkerY 
page 15 ~ A. Harry Wooding. 
Q. So, Harry Wooding then agreed to the $4,-
500. You and Barker didn't get together, but your lawyers 
got together for you? 
A. I wouldn't say they got -together. 
~ ·Q. You had an agreement. You did not have any trial, 
did you? 
A. I know it wasn't tried by- a jury. 
Q. It wasn't tried by anybody. Wasn't it just an agreed 
verdict? 
A. We went thru a proce.eding. 
Q. There wasn't any :fi-ght about it? 
A. There was an argument over it. 
Q. You didn't go thru any trial, did yo.u T 
A~ No." 
Whereupon plaintiff moved to strike out the evidence and 
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objected to all other evidence relative to whether the verdict 
in the action of Hettie I. Davis's Administrator v. Marion M. 
Barker was entered by consent, upon the ground that the in-
surance company wrote Barker the letter of July 27, 1926, de-
nying liability under the policy and the insurance company 
waived its right to take control of the defense of said ac-
tion. 
Be it further remembered that on the trial of this case the 
witness Otis Bradley, called by the defendant was asked the 
following question: 
"Q. I want to ask you whethei· this case against Mr. BarkeT 
originally-when they got judgment against Mr. Barker, if 
that wasn't an agreed verdic.t 1'' 
Whereupon plaintiff objected upon the gTound that the 
record of the trial referred to speaks for itself and cannot 
be contradicted; and upon the further ground that even 
though there was an agreed verdict, ~his is immaterial and 
irrelevant so far as the issued in the case at bar is con-
. cerned because the insurance company had theretofore denied 
all liability under the policy and had ;; bandoned Barker and 
directed him to employ his own counsel and defend himself as 
best he could. 
The Court permitted the witness to answer as follows: 
page 16 ~ ''A. The judgment was entered by consent, 
signed by the jury.'' 
To which action of the Court the plaintiff excepted on the 
gr<?und above stated. 
Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 10. 
The following instructions granted at the request of the 
plaintiff, and of the defendant, and upon the Court's own 
motion, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, are all the in-
structions that were granted on the trial of this case: · 
~·-
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INSTRUCTION NO.3 (Given for the Defendant). 
The Court instructs the jury that the basis of this action 
is a policy of insurance issued by the defendant to Marion M. 
Barker, and that the parties to that l'Ontract, in determining 
any rights or liabilities thereunder nre bound by the pro-
visions contained in the contract. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 (Given by the Court of Its Own 
Motion). 
The Court instructs the jury that·-if they believe from the 
evidence under all the Circumstances that the assured refused 
to co-operate with the insurance company, and that the com-
pany used due diligence to obtain his co-operation and was 
precluded thereby from investigating or making a proper de-
fense of the action brought against Barker and from car-
rying out its obligations under the policy, or if the assured 
fraudulently colluded with the plaintiff to the prejudice of 
the defendant's rights then the defendant is .not liable in this 
action. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 (Given for the Plaintiff). 
The Court further instructs the jury that the burden is on 
the defendant to prove fraudulent coll!lSion by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 
page 17 ~-INS'TRUCTION "C" (As Amended and Given 
· · by the Court). 
The Court further instructs the jury that the condition of 
the policy that it shall not cover any liability voluntarily as-
sumed by the assured, bound Barker to comply with this pro-
vision so as not to interfere with or preclude defendant from 
controlling the settlement or defense of any claim or suit 
against Barker growing out of the use of his said automobile. 
This clause was intended for the protection of the defendant 
company and was binding on Barker so long as the defendant 
company recognized Barker as the assured under said policy1 
as to the Davis accident. The court further tells the jury, 
however, that this provision of the policy may be waived by 
the defendant company so as not ther1'lafter to be binding on 
Barker. 
The Court further tells the jury that if they believe from 
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. H. I. Davis' Adm'r. 27 
the evidence that the defendant company on July 27, 1926, 
disclaimed liability under said policy for the fatal accident to 
Hettie I. Davis such disclaimer operated as a waiver of the 
above condition of said policy so as not to bind Barker to a 
compliance therewith after July 27, 1.926. The jury are, 
therefore, not to inquire whether the judgment recovered by 
Covington, Administrator, against Barker was based on a 
verdict entered by Barker's consent, if done in good faith, 
acting on advice of counsel employed ty him. 
INSTRUCTION "B'' (Given by the Court of Its Own 
Motion). 
The Court instructs the jury that jf they believe from the 
preponderance of the evidence in this case that the defendant 
insured Marion Barker in accordanee with the policy intro-
duced in evidence; that on the 5th day of April, 1926, Hettie 
I. Davis, while in the Essex Roadster mentioned in the policy, 
was killed as result of an accident in the use of said automo-
bile; that the insu,rance company was promptly notified of 
said accident and that Barker up to .July 27th, 1926, the date 
the letter from the insurance company denying liability was 
received, at all times rendered to the company all co-opera-
. tion and assistance in his power, and whenever r~ 
page 18 ~ quested aided in securing information and evidence 
and. the attendance of witnesses; that after the 
]nsurance company notified Barker of its refusal to defend or 
recognize any liability under the poliey, an action was insti-
tuted against Barker by John Covington, qualified Adminis-
trator of Heftie I. Davis at the October term of the court and 
judgment against Barker was obtained for $4,500.00 for dam-
ages on account of ~aid accident, and execution on this judg-
ment was returned unsatisfied and th'lt the amount of said 
judgment could not be collected because of the insolvency of 
Barker, then the jury should find for the plaintiff in this ac-
tion and· fix the amount of the damaged as $4,500.00, plus in-
terest from October 7, 1926, to Feb. 7, 1927,$90.00, plus $.13.03 
costs. And this is true regardless of whether judgment 
against Barker was entered against him by consent as a com,:, 
promise upon advice of his counsel or not, unless the jury 
believe such judgment was secured by fraudulent collusion 
between Barker and the plaintiff. 
Teste : March 22, 1927. 
~· D. DABNEY, Judge. 
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"EXHIBIT COVINGTON #L" 
Virginia: 
Pleas before the Judge of the Corporation Court of Dan-
ville, at the Courthouse thereof, on the 7th day of October, 
1926. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, i:o-wit, on the 12th day 
of August, 1926, came Jno. A. Covington, Administrator of 
Hettie I. Davis, deceased, by his attorneys and filed in the. 
Clerk's Office of said court his notice to recover judgment 
against Marion M. Barker, which notice is in the following 
words and figures, to-wit: 
Mr. Marion M. Barker, 
609 Keen Street, 
Danville, V a. 
page 19 ~ Siu: 
"NOTICE." 
Please take notice that I, .John A. Covington, 
as the duly qualified administrator of Miss Hettie I. Davis, 
wil.l, on the 7th day of September, 1926, or as soon thereafter 
as counsel may be heard, move the Corpor.-:ttion·Court of Dan-
ville, Virginia, for a judgment against you in the sum of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) damages which I am entitled 
to recover against you for the wrongful death of the said Het-
tie I. Davis, deceased, caused by your negligence, that is to· 
say: 
That, to-wit, on April 5', 1926, you invited the said Hettie 
I. Davis to take an automobile ride ·with you as your guest, 
and thereupon it became your duty to exercise reasonable care 
to drive said automobile at a reasonable rate of speed and 
at all times to keep proper control of said automobile and so 
drive same as not to injure the said Hettie I. Davis. You, 
however, on the day and year aforesaid, negligently failed to 
perform the duty resting upon you as aforesaid, and on the 
contrary recklessly, and negligently managed and drove said 
automobile over a narrow, steep and rough road in Pittsyl-
vania County, Virginia, at a dangerous and unlawful rate of 
spe~d, without keeping same under r:ontrol, and wholly by 
reason of your negligence. in the improper management and 
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operation of said car, said automobile was overturned and 
the said Hettie I. Davis was thrown from the seat of said car 
and killed. 
Whereupon a cause of action has accrued to me, her duly 
qualified personal representative, against you and I shall, 
therefore, move for judgment against you for the sum afore-
said. 
JOHN A. COVINGTON, 
·Administrator of Hettie I. Davis, Deceased. 
' 
By HARRIS, HARVEY & BROWN, Counsel.'' 
.. :-,. )"" 
"R.ETURN ON NOTICE." 
"Not finding Marion M. Barker at hjs usual place of abode, 
I delivered Ida W. Walker, his wife, a member of 
page 20 ~ his family, over sixteen years of age, at said place 
· of abode, a true copy 9f the within notice, giving 
information of its purport to her, on the 12th day of August, 
1926, within my bailiwick. 
P. U. BOISSEAU, 
Sgt. City of Danville, V a . 
.And at another day, to-wit:. At a Corporation Court of 
Danville, held at the Courthouse thereof on the 7th day of 
October, 1926. 
This day came as well the plaintiff as the defendant by 
their attorneys, thereupon the defendant filed, in writing, his 
grounds of defense to said notice, whi~h grounds. of defens·e 
in words and :figures mre as follows: 
''GROUNDS' OF DEFENSE." 
John A. Covington, Admr. of Hettie I. Davis, deed., 
vs. 
Marion M. Barker. 
The defendant, Marion M. Barker, states as his grounds 
of defense to this action the following: · 
First: That he was guilty of no negligence in connection 
with the matter in the notice mentioned. 
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Second: That if negligence was the cause of the death of 
the said Hettie I. Davis, then it was the negligence of the said· 
Hettie I. Davis and not the negligence of M~rion M. Barker. 
Third: That said Marion M. Barker was not at the time 
driving said car, had no control over same and that said au-
tomobile in question was under the exdusiV'e control and be-
ing operated by the .said Hettie I. Da .. ds. 
Fourth: This defendant says that rrt the time mentioned 
in the notice in motion the said Hettie I. Davis, desiring to 
buy the automobile from Marion M. Barker, was riding in 
. said automobile and had driven same herself for a number 
of miles and apparently understood the operation of said au-
tomobile, having previously driven' it and while the said Het-
tie I. Davis was driving said automobile, having exclusive 
control of the management and operation of said 
page 21 ~ automobile and while this defendant was seated 
by her side the said Hettie I. Davis suddenly and 
without warning drove said automobile off of the road there-
by receiving the injuries which resulted in her death and very 
seriously injuring this defendant. 
Fifth: Defendant denies that said automobile was being 
driven by him at any reckless or negligent rate of speed and 
denies that said automobile at the time was being driven. by 
him at all. · 
Sixth: And the defendant says that he was not negligent 
in permitting said Hettie I: Davis to drive said car because 
he had every. reason to be assured that she understood how 
to manage, control and operate the same. 
6th. The defendant says that the n~gligence. of the afore-
said Hettie I. Davis as above set forth contributed to her 
death. 
HARRY WOODING, JR., 
By Counsel. 
Whereupon said plaintiff, with leave of Court, filed his 
amended notice against said defendant, which is in the words 
and figures following, to-wit: 
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. H. I. Davis' Adm'r. 11. 
"AMENDED NOTICE. ' 1 
Mr. Marion M. Barker, 
609 Keen Street 




Please take notice that I, John A. Covington, as the duly 
qualified administrator of Miss Hettie I. Davis, will, on the 
7th d!'tY of September, 1926, or as soon thereafter as counsel 
may be heard, move the Corporation Court of Danville, Vir-
ginia, for a judgment against you in the sum of Ten Thou· 
sand Dollars ($10,000.00) damages whirh I am entitled tore· 
cover against you for the wrongful death of the said Hettie 
I Davis, deceased, caused by your negligence, that is to say: 
; 
That, to-wit, on April 5, 1926, you invited the said Hettie 
I. Davis to take an automobile ride with you as 
page 22 ~ your ·guest, and thereupon it became your duty to 
exercise reasonable care to drive said automobile 
at a reasonable rate of speed and at all times to keep proper 
control of said automobile and so drive same as not to injure 
the said Hettie I. Davis. You, however, on the day and year 
aforesaid, negligently failed to perform the duty resting upon 
you as aforesaid, and on the contrary recklessly and negli-
gently managed and drove said aut-::>mobile over a narrow, 
steep and rough road in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, at a 
dangerous and unlawful rate of speed, without keeping same 
/under control, and wholly by reason of your negligence in 
· the improper management and operation of said car, said 
automobile was overturned and the ~aid Hettie I. Davis was 
thrown from the seat of said car anrl killed. 
And said motion will be made upon the further ground, 
that, to-wit, on April 5, 1926, at your special instance and re-
quest, the said Hettie I. Davis became a passenger in your 
automobile, and you undertook to demonstrate the use and 
operation of said automobile to her for the purpose of in-
ducing her to purchase said automobile, and thereupon it be-
came and was your duty to exercise due and reasonable care 
. in and about demonstrating and instructing said Hettie I. 
Davis in the use of said automobile E'O that same could be 
operated safely and without undue danger of injury to said 
Hettie I. Davis. You, however, on the day and year afore-
said, with knowledge that the said Hettie I. Davis was a 
novice in the operation of automobile and was unskilled in 
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their operation and unfamiliar with the mechanical devices 
controlling the starting, stopping, steering and control of au-
tomobiles, permitted. said Hettie I. Davis to take hold of the 
steering apparatus of said automobile, without using due and 
reasonable care to properly instruct, guide and direc-t the OP'" 
eration and control of said car, and negligently directed the 
driving of said automobile along and over a narrow, one-t:r;ack, 
·rough, uneven and unimproved roadway in Pittsylvania: 
· County, Virginia, at a point on said roadway lead-
page 23 ~ ing down a sharp grade over a narrow, one-track 
. bridge, with deep ravines on both sides of the said 
roadway as· it approached said narrow bridge, well knowing 
the dangers incident to the use of the roadway at this point 
by said Hettie I. Davis, a person unskilled in the operation 
and control of said automobile, and moreover negligently and 
carelessly permitted and allowed saia automobile to be driven 
out of the used track along said roadway, too near to the 
ravine or ditch on the right..:hand side of said road to be 
safely operated, and negligently and carelessly failed to adopt 
any means or take any control of said car to prevent its slid-
ing or running off of said embankment, and as a re~ult of 
your negligence and carelessness aforesaid, said automobile, 
while being operated along said dangerous roadway, left said 
roadway and turned over or fell into said ravine, and over-
turned, thereby severely wounding and causing the death of' 
said Hettie I. Davis; when, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
as the car approached said narrow "l)ri9-ge, you could have 
guided and-controlled and directed said automobile back into 
the roadway to a place of safety. 
Whereupon a c.ause of action has aecrued to me, her duly 
qualified personal representative, against you, and I shall, 
therefore, move for judgment against you for the sum afore-
said. 
JOHN A. COVINGTON, 
Administrator of Hettie I. Davis, Deceased. 
By HARRIS, HARVEY & BROWN, Counsel. 
Thereupon the said defendant saith that he is not guilty in 
the manner and form as in the plaintiff's notice of motion is 
alleged and that be puts himself upon the country and the 
plaintiff doth alike. 
Whereupon came the jury, to-wit: J. T. Townes, E. :F\ 
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Meador, Walter J. Adams, B. 0. Lee, R. N. Williams, S. T. 
:Martin, F. :M. Findley, Jr., who being elected, tried and sworn 
.according to law, well and truly to try the issue joined, and 
having heard the evidence in full ana having heard the ar-
guments of counsel, were sent out of court to con-
page 24 } suit of their verdict and after some time returned 
and upon their oath do say, "We, the jury, find 
for the plaintiff and assess his dama~?:es as Forty~:five Hun-
. dred Dollars, and direct that .this recovery be shared equally 
between :Margaret L. Davis and Mrs. Lillie Burrell, the sis-
t-ers of the deceased, to the exclusion of the other kin:'' 
Therefore, it is considered by the court that the plaintiff 
recover against said defendant Forty-five Hundred ($4,-
500.00) Dollars, his damages by the jurors in their verdict 
ascertained with interest thereon at six per cent per annum 
from today, to-wit, the 7th day of October, 1926, until paid 
and hiB costs by him in his notice in this behalf expended. 
Copy-Teste~ 
OTIS BRADT.JEY, Clerk. 
page 25 } The following evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, 
and of the defendant, respectively, as hereinafter 
denoted, is all evidence that was introduced on the trial of 
this case. 
EVIDENCE. 
In the Corporatio-n Court of Danville, Virginia. 
John A. Covington, Administrator of Hettie I. Davis, 
v. 
Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, Philadd-
phia. 
Testimony taken before Judge Dabney, presiding for Ju!fge 
D. Price Withers, February term. 19~'7. 
Present: E. Walton Brown and Malcolm K. Harris, of 
Harris, Harvey & Brown, Counsel for plaintiff; A. M:. Aiken 
of Aiken & Benton, counsel for defendant. 
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The witness, 
JOHN A. COVINGTON, 
being :first duly sworn, testified as follows~ 
DIRECT EXAMIN A'TTON. I 
Mr. Harris: 
· Q. Your name is Mr. J·ohn A. Covington~! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You live in Danville. and are engaged in the hardware 
business? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. It appears here that you allege that yon urf~ the duly 
. qualified administrator of Miss Hettie I. Davis, who was 
killed in an automobile accident. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What court did you qualify in 
A. The court here in Danville. 
Q. You qualified before Mr. Bradley~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mr .. Covington, Miss Davis-you might explain to 
the jury your interest in the matter- -Miss Davis had been 
employed by you for a number of years T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. She was employed by you in what capacity? 
A. Bookkeeper. 
pa~e 26 ~ Q. You brought suit as her administrator against 
Marion M. Barker for damages? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you brought suit for $10,000 
A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. You obtained a judgment in thi.~ ·court for $4,500¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was that money to go to i:f you collected it as ad-
ministrator? 
A. To Miss Lalie Davis and Mrs. Burl, her two sisters. 
By Mr. Harris: We offer in evidence a certified copy or 
the record of the proceedings before Judge Withers, which 
shows :final judgment and order entered on the 7th day or 
October before Judge Withers for $4!500. \Ve mark it Ex-
hibit Covington #1. 
Q. Mr. Covington, is this the insurance policy upon which 
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. H. I. Davis' Adm 'r. 35 
the present suit is based Y (Handing policy to witness.) 
Policy marked "Exhibit Policy". 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know where this policy came from-how we 
happened to get it Y 
4. I suppose it came from Ramey & Ashworth. 
Q. Do you understand how we got it as counsel engaged 
in this suit Y Where it was Y Did you ever have possession 
of it¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you didn't give it to us? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. There has been some sort of suggestion here by Judge 
Aiken that there is some sort of collusion between you and 
Mr. Barker to obtain this judgment. Did you ever collude 
with Barker in any way? 
A. I have never discussed it with Mr. Barker in any way, 
shape or form. 
Q .. Did you ever try to get in toucl1 with him and get the 
case disposed of before you brought the suit? 
A. You mean right after the young lady's death Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. Y e'S, I tried to-not direct to him. . I tried to 
page 27 ~ get a discussion thru or from Mr. Yarbrough, to 
find out the particulars. 
Q. Did you ever collude with Mr. Barker in any way at 
all ahout bringing suit against him t 
A. Not in the least. I haven't discmsed it with him at all. 
Q. The date that Mr. Bradley furnishes me here .Ahows 
that you qualified on April 9. How soon after that did you 
employ counsel and do the best you could to protect the in~ · 
terest of these parties · 
A. I expect perhaps it was a month after that. 
Q. That you employed attorneys to bring the suit? 
A. Something like that . 
. Q .. Mr; Aiken also says that you as aJmiuistrator told some~ 
. body that you weren't going to bring 9. suit. Did you ever 
tell anybody that? 
A. I think Judge misunderstood. I discussed with Ramey 
& Ashworth abo]lt the case, and Mr. Ramey seemed to be irri~ · 
tated about it. I said "Homer, I personally will never bring 
suit against him. It is purely up to the family. I haYen't 
any personal interest in this". 
Q. Was that before you qualified r..~:~ administrated 
A. Before I eyen qualified as administrator. 
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Q. Where was thaU 
A. In Ramey & Ashworth's office. 
Q. They were agents of the insur9.nce company here 'l 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you ever tell them that you 7.rere not going to bring 
any suit as far as administrator was concerned~ 
A. No, sir; never discussed it. Mr. Yarbrough told me that 
he had notified Ramey & Ashworth of this accident, and I 
went up there and discussed it with Homer Ramey. He said 
he didn't care to talk about it, said it was absurd. Said that 
Barker should sue Miss Davis for damages, that she was the 
one that caused the wreck. I said "Are you sure that what 
was said in the newspaper is right~" And he said "Abso-
lutely". · 
Q. And he seemed to be irritated about discussing it with 
you? 
A. Yes. 
page 2S ~ Q. Let's get it straight. 
A. I told him I personally would never bring a 
suit against him. 
Q. You had no personal interest in it'! 
A. No personal interest. I told 11im that it was up to the 
family. . 
Q. There was a piece published in the paper about it7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say Mr. Ramey said that.he was satisfied-that what 
was in the paper was true and that it was absurd to ever 
think about bringing a suiU 
A. That was substantially his statement. 
Q. How long have you known Marion Barker 1 
A. Why I would say 7, S or 10 years. 
Q. Do you know his financial ability to pay his debts~ 
A. I have always understood he didn't have anything, but 
have never investigated. 





Q. You have no personal controversy with Mr. Barker have 
you? 
A. In regard to the case? 
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Q. In regard to .anythi:b.g? 
A. Personal controversy1 
.Q. Yes. · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Never have had? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So, naturally you personally wouldn't sue Mr. Barker 
for anything, woul-d you? 
A. It depends altogether on what l1e had done. I had no 
grounds in· the world whatever. 
Q. He has never done anything to you to sue him for~ 
A.·No, sir. 
page 29 ~ Q. If you sued him at fill you would naturally 
. be suing as administrator wouldn't you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. You .say that you didn't lmow anything about his policy. 
Did I understand you to say that? 
A. Mr. Harris asked me how we got it. 
·Q. Do you know how he got it7 
A. Nothing but what they said. 
Q. When did you first get that policy¥ 
A. When did I first get it 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. I have never had my hands on~-
Q. Do you know when your counsel got it' 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever see that policy before 7 
A. No. 
Q. How did you bring a suit on that policy if you have never 
seen it7 
Objection by counsel for plaintiff. 
Sustained. 
Q. Did you bring a suit on that poJicy before you ever saw 
the policy7 
A. Judge, I had read a copy of the policy. I knew what it 
contained, but that policy itself I haven't seen it. 
Q. Where did you get a copy of the policy? 
A. I happen to have one myself. I think my automobile 
has the same policy. 
Qt How did you know Mr. Barker bad a policy with the 
company? 
A. Mr. Yarbrough told me so, and that he had notified 
Ramey & Ashworth of the. accident. 
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·Q. You spoke about the trial you had up here. You said 
you never did· talk to Mr. Barker about this case'! 
A. No, sir. . · . 
Q. You brought suit for $10,000 and settled it 
page 30 ~ up here for $4,500. You did that-how d1.1. you 
work that without talking to Mr. Barker~ · 
A. How did we work that without talking to Mr. Barker t 
Q. Yes. 
A. That was worked thru the counsE'l. I discussed it with 
Mr. Harris and Brown. 
Q. Harris and Erown represent you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You agreed on the $4,500Y 
A. Yes. 
·Q. Who was representing Mr. Barker'r. 
A. Harry Wooding. 
Ql. So, Harry Wooding then agre~~d to the $4,500. You 
and Barker didn't get together, but your lawyers got together 
for youf · 
A. I wouldn't say they got togetbe1·. 
Q. You had an agreement. You didn't have any trial, did 
you? 
A. I know it wasn't 'tried by a jury. 
Q. It wasn't tried b. anybody. Wasn't it just an agreed 
verdict? 
A. We went thru a proceeding. 
Q. There wasn't any fight about it~ 
A. There was an argument over it. 
Q. You didn't go thru any trial did you f 
A. No. 
By Mr. Brown: Just to keep the record straight we want 
to move the court to strike out all of the evidence relative t() 
what happened at the trial and what didn't happen, because 
our contention is that after July 27, 1926, the insurance com-
pany wrote to Mr. Barker that they were done with him and 
denied liability, that he should go ahead and defend him-
self. Therefore the insurance comp:my isn't in the position 
to object or complain of how well Mr. Barker defended him-
self, that they have waived any right to inquire into or con-
cern themselves about the judgment that was obtained. 
page 31 ~ The witness, ........ · 
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P. H, BOISSEAU, 
being duly sworn., testified as follow~; 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. "You are the sergeant of the City of Danville~ 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You had an execution issued on the judgment in favor 
of John Covington as administrator v. Marion Barked 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you return that execution ''no effects"~ 
A. Yes, sir, 
·Q. Is this the execution th.at you returned here-a copy of 
iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Execution is· offered in evidence as Exhibit Boisseau #1 
and reads as follows: 
·"Deft's Costs. 
Clerk ~s Costs $1.50 (FIERI FA CI.AS} 
. The Commonwealth of Virginia, 
To the Sergeant of the City of Danville-Greeting: 
We command You that of the Goods and Chattels of Marion 
M. Barker late in your bailiwick, you cause to be made the 
sum of F·orty Five Hundred dollars, with interest thereon, at 
the rate of six per centum· per annum, from the 7th day of 
October, 1926, till paid; also 31.53 Dollars costs, which John 
A. Covington, Administrator of Hettie I. Davis, dec'd lately 
in our Corporation Court of Danville recovered against hiin 
as well for Damage and interest thereon as for his costs by 
him about his suit in that behalf expended, whereof the said 
Marion M. Barker is convicted as appears to us of record: 
And that you have the said sunis of money before the Judge 
of our said Corporation Court on the first day of November 
Court next, to render to said John A. Covington, administraa 
tor of Hettie I. Davis, dec'd of the Damages, costs and in· 
terest aforesaid. And have then there this writ. 
Witness, OTIS BRADLEY, Clerk of our said Court, at the 
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Courthouse, this 14th day of October, 1926, in the 151st year 
of the Commonwealth. 
OTIS BRADLEY1 Clerk. 
Copy-Teste: 
OTIS BR ... '\.DLEY1 Clerk.''' 






H. H. & B. 
Hettie L Davis ' Admr. 
vs. FI.FA. 
Marion M. Barker. 
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''Returnable to 
· Nov. Court, 1926. 
PlJAINTIFF'S COST 
Clerk's Fees, ........ $9.73 
Justice's Costs .... . 
Sergeant's ~,ees, . . . . 3.50 
Witnesses, ... · . . . . . . . 5.30 
Notary, ............ . 
Attorney and Tax, . . . 13.00 
Total, . $31.53 
STA.TEMENT 
Fiere Facias . . . . ........ . 
Interest ................ . 
to ........ , ... 192 ....... . 
Clerk's Fees, ............ . 
Justice's Costs, .......... . 
Sergeant ;s Fees, .. . 
(continued) 
Witness Fees, . . . . ........ . 
Attorney's Fees and Tax .. . 
Levy, ................... . 
Taking Bond, ............. · 
Commissions, . . . . ....... . 
'The money herein men-
tioned cannot be made. 
Execution debtor is in-
solvent' 
P. H. BOISSEAU, Sergeant. 
Copy-Teste : 
.. OTIS' BRADLEY, Clerk.'' 
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Came to hand on the 15th 
day of Oct 1926 
at 4 o'clock. :. 
P~ H. BOISSE • .\. U, Sergeant." 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. You say that you returned this execution "no effects"? 
· A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. I wish you would look at it and see where you returned 
it "no effects". 
A. I don't see it here. 
Q. You didn't return it "no effects" 7 
·.A. I don't see any return here at a.n. 
Mr. Harris (intervening) : 
Q. What does it say on there? 
A. It says ''The money herein m9ntioned cannot be made. 
Execution d-ebtor is insolvent". · 
Mr. Aiken resumed examination: 
Q. When you told Mr. Harris you returned it no effects-
it is your custom to return them '.'no effects"? 
A. I went over to levy on the property and the lady up tliere 
I told her I wanted to see it all. 
Ql. I wasn't going into that questjon. It is your cusbm 
to return them "no effects" when you make it? 
A. Yes, sir . 
. ·Q. How did it happen that you didn't return this "no ef-
fects''? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. How did you happen to make this peculiar re-
page 33 ~ turn? 
A. I made a copy of it. 
Q. You remember making the original of which that is a 
copy? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you tell us how you happened to make it in tha.t 
manner? Have you ever returned one before like that? 
A. I expect I have. 
Q. You don't remember any other 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Who told you to :fix it like that? · 1 
A. I can't remember. 
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Q. Did any lawyer tell you to fix it that way' 
A. Somebody told me to go and see whether he was in-
solvent. 
Q. Who was that? 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. Was it Mr. Covington? 
A. I don't know anything about it. 
Q. You know Mr. John Covington don't you 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he, tell you to do it¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Any of his lawyers tell youf 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. How did you happen to go over there f 
A. I wanted to find out whether he wa8 insolvent or not. 
Q. Tell us what efforts you made to find out whether he 
was insolvent. 
A. I looked at everything he had in his house . 
. ·Q. What did you look at? 
A. Looked at a piano, stool, tables and chairs and beds. 
Q. What did you ask about them? 
A. I don't know. 
Objection by counsel for plaintiff to this questioning of Mr. 
Boisseau as to his conduct in his efforts to find out whether 
Barker was insolvent. 
Objection overruled. 
· page 34 ~ To which counsel for plaintiff excepted and 
saved the point. 
A. Continued. He told me himself that he didn't have a 
. thing there. 
Q. And that is as far as you looked f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't know whether he had any money in the bank'! 
A. Didn't examine the bank or didn't examine any records. 
Q. You don't know what real estate he had f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. He might own a big block of cotton mill stock and you 
wouldn't know it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Y QU don't know whether he was insolvent or not do 
.you? 
A. That is what he told me and what his wife told me. I 
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asked him what property he had and he said he had nothing. 
I looked at everything in his house aml his wife claimed every-: 
thing. · 
·Q. That is as far as you looked~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have no idea what the fellow is worth, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
RE-DIRE.CT EXAMIN.ATION. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. If you had collected that money wouldn't you have got 
a commission on iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have been living here in Danville and been ser-
geant how long? 
A.· QS years. 
Q. How long have you known Marion Barker? 
A. I have known him for a long time. 
Q. Did you in good faith try to collect the money? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Qt Was there anything you found that you could have made 
it out o£1 
A. No, sir. 
. Q. You would like to have found something, 
page 35 ~ wouldn't you? 
A. Yes, sir; would like to have found something. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. You didn't go any furtlwr than this there at his home? 
A. No, sir; that is all I found out. 
Q. Didn't look into his real estate or his investment hold-
ings~ . 
A. I didn't examine the records at the clerk's office. 
RE-RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. Mr. Aiken talks to you about levying on real estate. 
You have been sergeant 28 years. Have you ever levied on 
Teal estate~ 
A. Never executed on real estate. 
Q. Never executed on real estate in your life~ 
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A. No, sir. 
Q\. Did you ever hear of a sergeant levying an execution on 
money in bank 7 · 
A. They wouldn't tell me if they had any. 
Q. You can't levy execution on money in the bank or on 
real estate either, can you? 
A. No, sir. 
RE"RE-GROS'S EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. If a man has .got a whole lot .of r<'al estate and he don't 
owe so much money on it he is not insolvent is he7 
· A. No, sir. 
Q: You undertook to say in there whether he was solvent 
or not¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't know whether he is solvent or not 1 
A. I do not. So far as I could find out he was insolvent. 
By the Judge:· 
Q. The question is whether he was solvent or insolvent. 
· You don't know whether or not he was solvent, but you 
couldn't find any property to levy on~ 
A. I co ulan 't find any. 
page 36 ~ The witness, 
J. W. YARBR01JGH, 




Q. Mr. Yarbrough, how long have you lived in Danville? 
A. About 40 years. 
Q\. What is your business¥ 
A. Real estate and insurance. 
·Q. Real estate and insurance.. Arc you connected with any 
building and loan association? 
A. Yes, sir. Phoenix Loan & Savings Company. 
Q. How long have you been connected with it? 
A. 20 years. 
Q. Does that company make a practice of lending money 
to various people in Danville? Is that what its business is? 
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.A. That is its business, yes, sir. . 
Q .. Does that require you as insurance agent and real estate 
agent operating ~e building and loan association to have 
general knowledge of the finaneial condition of the parties 
you deal with? 
A. To some extent, yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known Marion Barker? 
A. Certainly 30 years, I think. 
Q. Will you tell the jury whether or not you are closely 
associated with him? Do you know him intimately or merely 
slightly? 
A. Intimately, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with his financial affairs? r , 
A. Yes, ·sir; I am. 
Q. _What is his occupation t 
A. He is a contractor. 
Q. -Based upon your intimate association with him and your 
knowledge of his affairs, will you pleaRe tell the jury whether 
or not at the time of the institution of this suit-
page 37 }- whether or not at the time of the return of this exe-
cution which was N ovemher. 1, 1926, whether Ma-
rion Barker was solvent or insolvent? 
A.· Gentlemen, that would depend altogether on what con-
struction you put on what insolvent means. Possibly I could 
tell you better by the way he conducts his business. Mr. 
Barker does a small contracting business He will contract 
for a house and he will buy his material on time with the 
understanding thatwhen the job is completed that either the 
owner of the house or himself will ~t-\ttle the bills. lfe has 
no capital in the business. It is often the case that the ma-
terial men will notify the owner of the house that they are 
holding them responsible and in that case the owner of the 
house or the building and loan association pays the material 
man directly. If they have confidence in Mr. Barker they let 
the bill run on and Mr. Barker pays the bill himself and if 
there is anything left over why Mr. Barker has it. 
Q~ Could Mr. Barker when this execution was issued .for 
this $4,500---did he have any property out of which the $4,500 
could be collected? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What property did he have? 
A. Mr. Barker and his brother owned a piece of real estate 
on Wyllie A venue on the north side of the river on which 
we have a loan that is for as much as the value of the prop-
erty. It is secured. 
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Q. You have a deed of trust on it'f 
A. We have a deed of trust to cover that. Besides that 
Mr. Barker does not own any property. He bought his home 
from us and had the property conveyed to his wife, Mrs. Ida 
W. Barker, at the time and that house belongs to his wife . 
. · Q. He has one piece of real estate in the name of his brother 
and himself and your building and loan association has got a 
loan to secure it for its value¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then if the definition of insolvent, Mr. Y ar-
page 38 ~ brough is that a person wm not pay his debts in 
due course, and a debt of $4,500.00 evidenced by 
judgment is exhibited against Barker, would you say he was 
solvent or insolvent? 
A. I would say he was insolvent. 
·Q. Do you recall at the time that the accident happened and 
Miss Davis was killed? Do you recall the incident? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And soon after that did you notify the insurance com-
pany of the accident or their agents? 
· A. Well, I couldn't say how long. 
Q. Did you notify them or did he notify them T 
A. Neither, I think. I called them over the phone, but I 
think that neither did. Mr. Barker was not in any condition 
to notify them. 
Q. He was hurt T 
. A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you discuss it with Ramey & Ashworth T 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. Did you phone them anything aLout itT 
A. I won't say positively I did. I ~tarted over the next 
day to do it, but didn't go to the office. 
Ql. How long was Mr. Barker sick after this accident hap-
pened? 
A. I think he wa~ in bed possibly 10 days or two weeks and 
he was incapacitated from doing any work possibly for a 
month or six weeks, but he was out walking around, but he 
was very sick for several days, badly burned. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. How did you happen to find out that Mr. Barker had 
this policy of insurance with the Indemnity Insurance Com-
pany'f · 
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A. My impression is I asked him. He told me but I don't 
remember whether I asked him about it or whether he told 
me voluntarily. 
Q. And you said you notified Ramey & Ashworth about it? 
A. No, sir; I didn't say that. 
Q. Who did you notify about iU 
page 39 ~ A. I started to notify them and spoke to Mr. 
Covington and he said he had already attended to 
it, so I didn't go. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Covington abQut him having a policy 
with the Indemnity Insurance Company? 
A. No, I don't think I did. . He. 11lready knew of it. 
Q. He stated here that you told him. 
A. Possibly I called him up and told him. I started to 
Ramey & Ashworth's office and stopped by Mr. Covington's -
store. We had discussed the matter ·before that on the tele-
phone and I stopped by the store and Mr. Covington told 
me he had seen Ramey & Ashworth about it. 
Q. You knew Mr. Covington was representing Miss Davis's 
heirs? 
A. Not at that time. 
Q. How long afterward? 
A. I don't think it was long after that. It was in a rea-
sonable length of time. 
Q. He was a friend of Miss Davis? 
A. I knew Miss Davis worked for Mr. Covington. He and 
I went up there at the time of the accident. 
Q. You think you talked to him about this policy? 
A. I think it is very likely. 
Q. What was your object in talking to him about the in-
surance policy? 
A. I thought it was necessary for the company to be noti-
fied and I knew Mr. Covington was Mjss Davis's friend, that 
she had worked for him. . 
Q. You were Mr. Barke·r's friend and Mr. Covington was 
Miss Davis's friend, so you thought you all ought to talk 
about that policy? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Anyway, you all did talk about it? 
A. Sure. 
Q. You say you are a very close frienq o£ Mr. Barker's? 
A. Yes, sir ; very close friend. 
Q. Do you remember Mr. Jesse Benton talking to you about, 
getting Mr. Barker to come to see him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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page 40 ~ ·Q. Did you know what he wanted with him! 
A. Yes. 
Q. WhaU 
A. He wanted to see him about this accident. 
Q. Did you talk to Mr. Barker about going to see him? 
A. I told him Mr. Benton wanted to see him. 
Q. What did he tell you Y 
A. He told me he was going. 
Q. Did you ever get Mr. Barker to tell you how this acci-
dent happened~ 
A. In a general way, yes, sir. 
Q. How long after it happened'r 
A. I suppose it was possibly three or four weeks. Imme-
diately after this accident Mr. Barker was nervous and whe11 
· you would get to talking with him he would get very nervous, 
and I think it was possibly four weeks. I asked him about it 
on one occasion and I saw what condition he got in when I 
talked to him about it. I was down at the office and took him 
back in· the private office and asked him about it as far as 
I could. He told me how the accident happened. 
Q. Told you how it happened? 
A. Told me how it happened . 
. Q. Did you ever tell anybody he told you Y ---.. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Benton? 
A. I don't know that I ever did. The next time after that 
when I saw Mr. Benton I think Mr. Bttrker and myself went 
·to Mr. Benton's office? · · 
Q. About how long was that after Mr. Barker told you 
about it? 
A. It couldn't have been very long. I don't remember. 
Q. At the time you and Mr. Barker went to Mr. Benton's 
office, about the 1st of September, after this suit had been 
brought? 
A. About that time. 
Q. That was about five months after the accident? 
A. I don't remember how long. 
Q. Do you mind telling 'liS what Mr. Barker told 
page 41 ~ you Y . . . 
Objection by counsel for plaintiff. 
S'ustained. 
Q. .Did I understand you to say that you haven't been tell-
ing anybody about what he told you¥ . · 
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A. Possibly I have discussed it with some parties. I don'.t 
say whether I have or not. 
·Q. You say you got him in your office. Was anybody pres-
ent besides you and him when he told you about it 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What was his attitude about discussing the accident 
soon after it happened.? 
A. As I have just stated, sir, he was just so nervous he 
simply couldn't talk. He would get io jerking and absolutely 
could not talk. · 
Q. About how soon after that did be go to work~ 
A. Why, I think possibly four or five weeks. 
Q. He worked on the house of Mr. Haraway up on Howe-
land Circle didn't he~ 
A. I have heard so. 
Q. I believe you say Mr. Barker is a building contractor~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He is able to get credit to get his building materials 1 
A. Yes, sir; he has succeeded so far. 
Q. When you loan people money in your building and loan 
you loan it on property itself and not on the person, don't 
you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't know what he might have except the house 1 
A. How was thaU 
Q. You don't know anything about what he has got out-
side of the house that you loaned money on, do you~ 
A. As far as the loan is concerned, but I do happen to know 
in this particular instance. 
Q. Do you think his financial condition has changed to 
amount to anything since the 1st day 0f last February? 
A. I know of no reason why it should. 
· page 42 }- The witness, 
HARRY WOODING, 
being duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. You are an attorney at law in Danville? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. We have introduced in evidence here the policy of in-
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surance. There is some question as to where it came from. 
Did you ever see it before? 
A. Mr. Barker turned that over to me on one occasion. 
Q. How did it get here before the court~ 
A. I brought it in here. There was a subpoena duces te·cum 
served on me to produce it. 
Q. And the court entered an order directing you to bring 
il~reY · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you also bring some letters in regard to that~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Pursuant to the m~bpoena also¥ 
A. Pursuant to the order of the court. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. How did these gentlemen here know that you had that 
policy, Mr. Wooding? Do you know·v 
A. I do not. The way l got the policy,. I was associated 
with Mr. Flynn and Mr. Flynn gave it to me. I got the 
spa. duces tecum from them. I might have said something 
about the policy.· They might have gotten. it from me. 
Q. Can you tell me how they knew about the letters? 
A. I represented Mr. Barker when he was sued and they 
probably knew I had the policy in that suit. 
Q. Those letters and that policy were in no way a part of 
the defense? 
A. Only indirectly. He brought the policy to ·show me the 
clause under which they claimed that they ought not to de-
fend him, and I was advising him along that line. 
Q. How do you suppose they found out you had the policyr 
A. I couldn't tell you to save my life how they 
page 43 ~ found it out. They knew I had the policy. 
· Q. And knew you had the letters? 
A. They knew I had the letters and they issued a spa. for 
me to produce them and ~ produced them. 
Mr. Harris offered in evidence a letter directed to the In-
demnity Insurance Company which is defendant in this suit. 
To which defendant objected because there was no witness. 
to prove it by. 
To which Mr. Harris replied by calling Mr. G. L Sweitzer 
· to identify and prove letter. 
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Mr. Harris: 
·Q. You are the secretary of the defendant companyY 
A. No, sir; I am the assistant secretary. 
Q. You received this letter and brought it here at the last 
trial of the court as having been received by your company 
did you notY 
A. I am not sure whether it was brought here by me or Mr. 
Aiken. · 
Q. You introduced it Y 
A. I did not introduce it. 
Q. It was introduced on your side as Exhibit Sweitzer :f:Fl. 
A. I don't _remember that. 
Q. Do you deny that it was received Y 
A. I don't know who introduced it. 
Q. You received iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. That letter refers to a newspaper account. Is the news:-
paper account with it Y 
A. No, sir: 
Q. Do you know what the newspaper account was? 
A. 1 assume that was the first newspaper account. 
Ql. You don't know what that account stated Y 
A. I don't know. My idea of that uewspape.r account was 
that it was very indefinite and· indicated I think 
page 44 ~ that Miss Davis was driviiJg the car. · 
( 
Objection to this answer by counsel for plaintiff. 
A. (Continued.) And that is the reason I assume that Mr. 
Ramey wrote that letter. 
Objection by plaintiff because answer is immaterial. 
Overruled. 
Mr. Harris (addressing Mr. Aiken): 
Q. Do you offer that as the facts~ 
Mr .. Aiken: I am c:>ffering it as a 11ewspaper account. 
Witness Sweitzer resuming: I know that the newspaper 
clipping enclosed in that letter had the statement to this ef~ 
feet, that Miss Davis was learning how to drive the car. 
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Q. Do you know whether that was the newspaper account 
that came with it or not 7 · 
A. I am pretty sure it was. 
Mr. Harris read letter of April 6', 1926,. to jury and offered 
it in evidence as Sweitzer #1 . 
. The letter reads as follows: 
Indemnity Insurance Company, 
Philadelphi11, Pa. 
Gentlemen:-
Re: Policy OA 123460 M. M. Barker 
"April 6, 1926. 
In reference to the above assured, we are enclosing here-
with account of an accident of Mr. Barker's in which a young 
lady was instantly killed. The account-is self explanatory. 
We do not think ther.e is· any chance· of a suit of even a·· 
contention to claim any damages from Mr. Barker. We, how-
ever, thought it best to report the accident to you promptly. 
Very truly yours, 
RHR.A' 1 
RAMEY & ASHWORTH, INC., 
(Signed) R. H. RAMEY, 
Sec 'y & Treas. 
Plaintiff rests. 
page 45 ~ Newspaper Clipping referred to reads as fol-
lows: 
"DANVILLE WOMAN 
. INSTANT VICTIM 
OF AUTO WRECK 
Skull of Miss Hettie Davis is Crushed as Car She is 
Driving Overturns. 
ACCIDENT HAPPENS NEAR STONY MILLS 
Marion Barker Escapes-
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The Easter holiday in Danville was marred yesterday} 
afternoon by an automobile fatality which claimed the life 
_ of Miss Hettie Dav:is, 28, a resident of Patton street, whose 
skull was crushed when an Essex rof!.dster in which she was 
riding with M.arion Barker, left the dirt road near S'tony 
Mills. 
Miss Davis, who was learning how to drive the _car, was 
instantly killed. Her head was caught between the side of 
the car and a rock in the gulley into which the car fell. Barker 
pinned down for twenty minutes, was rescued by help which 
arrived swiftly, after word of the disaster had spread. 
Car Evidently Running Slow. 
The Stony Mills road joins the Henry county pike at the 
home of Ben W. Dodson. It was about two miles below that 
· point, where the road runs down hill aud curves to a narrow 
bridg-e which spans Stony creek. It was evident that the car 
was not movmg swiftly, or it would have been hurled into 
the stream. It could be seen that the car wheel had struck 
one of the stone abuttments and had then rolled completely 
over. Had Miss Davis. fallen to the footboard of the car 
she would have been saved for the machine came to a pause 
upside down, but with plenty of room between the seat and 
the bottom of the gulley. As it rolled, it is possible that the 
young woman tried to jump and in this way her head became 
caught, one of the iron supports of the hood penetrating her 
brain. 
Colored Boy Summoned Aid 
An unidentified colored boy saw the fatality and ran to a 
number of colored men in a :field. They, in turn, notified 
J. A. Hall who lives on the B. K. Jones' farm, and the group 
ran to the scene. This was ten minutes after the crash. At 
first all thought that those in the car had made their escape, 
but to make sure Hall called out: · 
''Is anybody in there Y '' 
"Someone ·get me out of here, before I die/' came the re-
ply of Barker .. "There's a lady in here, too." By the use 
of three limbs the group of men, six in all, pried up the car. 
The sight was shocking. It was evident that the girl was 
dead, her skull being badly crushed. 
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Barker Has Miraculous Escape 
Her body was removed as soon &s: che car had been pried 
up and at the sam~ time Barker, who miraculously had es-· 
~aped serious injury, was rele&sed. TJ:n).ierved and shocked 
by the sight, Hall brought him to Danville, arid in the mean_; 
time Townes' and Son sent ·an ambulance car to the scene 
to bring the body. Before this was done, ho"W"ever, Magistrate 
Dodson was sent for, but it was fouild he was in Chatham. 
Magistrate R. S. Fitts designated JeE~se W. Yarborough to 
act as coroner, and ~fter hearing the story of Barker and the 
story of the colored boy, the removal of the body was au~ 
thorized. . 
· · Reports current that B::trker, after the accident, 
page 46 ~ had left-the scene of the fatality, were shown to be' 
entirely without foundation. This. could not hav~ 
been the case, as both the body of Mis;s Davis and Mr. Barker 
was released at the same time. 
Veritable Death Tr~:~,p 
The spot where the accident took nluce is q veritable death 
trap and people in the vicinity, assisting in salvaging th~ 
car, said that they had repeatedly pointed ont the danger to 
the county authorities. 
Miss Davis was planning to buy the car from Barker, who 
in turn was intending to secure an ]~Jssex cab. They wer~ 
together yesterday evening, for the purpose of instructing 
the prospective buyer how to operate the car. The theory 
is that the rough road caused the machine to leave the beaten; 
path, and in the loose earth, it slid over the crest of the gulley 
before Miss Davis, who was inexperien~ed at the wheel, could 
handle the situation. 
Miss Davis was associated with the Union Hardware Com-
pany's store on Main Street and was a popular young woman; 
living with her sister and brother-in-law on Patton Street. 
While Mr. Barker was not seriously injured when the car: 
overturned, yet the gasoline dripping upon his back and 
shoulders for some time, caused the flesh to be badly scalded, 
which has caused him considerable suffering. · 
page 47 ~ The :first witness for defendant, 
G. I. SWEITZ.ER, 
being duly sworn, testified as follows: 




· Q. Mr. Sweitzer, will you state wlw.t your position is? 
A. I am assistant se~retary of the Indemnity Insuranc~ 
Company of North America: in ~harge of claims. · · 
· Q. Where is your home offi~~ 1 · · 
A. Philadelphi~. 
Q. Your company is the Indemnity I11surance C.om.pany of 
North America 7 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. State .whether this is a policy issued by you:r ~ompany¥ 
(Handing witness polipy.) 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Sweitzer, here is a letter that these g~ntlemen in-
troduced by you an:d asked you whether it was received by 
you. I believe you told Mr. Harris that you received that 
letter at your offipe Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Have you the newspaper clipping that was inGlosed with 
iU 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether the one that was shown you on 
the witness stand before was the same? ' 
A. I am not sur.e. 
Q. What did your company do when you got the information 
contained in that letter about there being an accident? 
A. We wrote to our agents, Ramey & Ashworth, telling 
them that we had heard-:-
Objection by counsel for plaintiff to hearsay evidence. 
Sustained. 
I wrote to the firm of Ramey & Ashworth and also to our 
attorneys, JY-[essrs. Aiken & Benton, and told them to investi-
gate. 
Q. Did you make an effort to ascertain how this accident 
occurred? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 48 ~ Q. Did you make an effort to get Mr. Barker, 
the ·beneficiary of the policy, to tell you how it 
occurred, in compliance with the policy itself? ' 
' A. I did. . 
Q: Did you ever get that information? 
A. I did not. ·· 
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. Q. How long did you endeavor to get iU 
A. Probably 3% months, almost 4 m:onths from the time 
we got the newspaper clipping to the time I sent out the letter 
disclaiming liability. . 
Q. How many letters did you write in an effort to obtain 
that information f 
Objection by plaintiff. 
Sustai;ned. · 
Q. Do you know what your attorneys did in an effort to 
get this information 7 
A. Yes. sir : I know that they tried. 
Mr. Harris {intervening): · 
Q. You couldn't know that of your own knowledget 
A. I found out thru our attorneys. 
Objection to this answer as hearsay. 
Sustained. 
Mr. Aiken, resuming: 
Ql. When did you write this letter?. (Handing witness let-
ter.) 
A. July 27. 
Please file this as Exhibit Sweitzer :f/:2 and read it to the 
jury. 
Exhibit Sweitzer #2 reads as follows: 
''REGISTERED MAIL-RECEIPT REQUIRED 
Mr. M. Barker, 
609 Keen Street, 
Danville, V a. 
Dear Sir: 
RE: File No. A-114327 
Hettie Davis (Fatal) 
Accident? 
July 27, 1926. 
' ' 
You hold with the Indemnity Insurance Company of North 
. ! 
! 
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America, an automobile policy No. CA-123460. An accident 
occurred at Stoney Mills near Danville, on or about April 
5th involving the death of Miss Hettie Davis. In 
page 49 ~ connection with this dea~h, arising out of the op-
eration of your Essex car, covered under the above 
policy, you failed to co-operate with us in the investigation 
of the accident. Your policy, among other things specifically 
provides that the assured shall at all times render to the com-
pany all co-operation in his power l'l.nd whenever requested 
shall aid in securing information and evidence. We, there-




(Signed) GASTON I. SWEITZER, 
Assistant Secretary.· 
Q. I understand then that you wrote that letter after you 
had been making an effort to get this information since early: 
in April? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Has your company ever yet f01md out just how this ac-
cident happened? 
A. It has not. 
Q. Has it ever found out who was to blame for it? 
A. No, sir; don't know who was driving the car. 
Q. Have you ever received enough information about it to 
know how to defend the suit? · 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. You live in Philadelphia? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Of course you ao:ri't know of your own knowledge what 
took place down here, do you?. 
A. No, sir. 
'Q. All you know is that the accident was reported to you-
you got information of the accident promptly? 
A. The only thing I got was the newspaper clipping.· 
Q. You got a notice from ·your own agents in Danville here 
that the accident had taken place Y 
A. I got a notice from the agent enclosing a newspaper 
clipping. 
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Q. And telling you that the accident had happened. 
A. I don't think they ~tated the accident hap~ 
page 50 ~ pened: I am not familiar ·with that letter. They 
may have in there, I don't know. 
Q. The letter is there in your hands. What does it say? 
A. ''In reference to the above assured, we are enclosing 
herewith account of an accident.'' 
Q. Along with that there came a newspaper accounU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your counsel introduced this newspaper clipping which 
is dated .. Tuesday Morning, April 6. 
·Mr. Aiken stated that he did. not introduce it. 
Ql. You got the newspaper clippingf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This is the newspaper clipping that describes an acci-
dent to Marion Barker's car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the death of Miss Davis 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it is dated April 6? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the letter was written to you on April 67 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Don't you think it is a pretty fair assumption that this 
is the newspaper clipping that came in the letter? 
A. I don't mean to swear to it. 
Q. I don't want you to swear to it, but in all reasonableness 
don't you think it is the one? 
A. It may have been the morning paper or the evening 
paper. 
Q\. Your company did have the insnrance policy on the car 
which caused the accident didp. 't you~ 
A. I don't know that. · 
Q. You don't know thaH 
A. No. 
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A. It doesn't say anything in here about it. 
(Referring to letter in hand.) 
Q. Doesn't it say "Re: Policy CA J23460 M. M. Barker"?' 
A. They don't say anything about the car. 
Q. You don't deny that that accident that occurred was 
covered by an automobile insured in this policy? 
A. I don't know. 
I· 
0 
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Q. Why did you disclaim it Y 
A. We couldn't get any co-operation~ 
Q. This was your policy, wasn't iU 
· A.- Yes, sir. 
Q. It was in force, wasn't iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And your agent did write you that that car insured un~ 
der this policy was the one that had the accident? You wrote 
him: "You hold with the Indemnity Insurance Company of 
North America an automobile policy No. Ca-123460.'~ That 
is this policy right here, isn't it? 
A. I don't know the number. (Referring to policy.) Yes, 
123460, that is right. 
Q. "An ~:~tccident occurred at Stoney Mills near Danville, 
on or about April 5th involving the death of Miss Hettie Da· 
vis." Is that correct? 
A. That is right. 
Q. "In connection with this death, arising out of the op· 
eration of your Essex car, covered under the above policy.'' 
A. That is the nearest information I could get. 
Q. You believe that to he true, don't you~ 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You said so, didn't you~ 
A. That is the nearest we could come to it. We had to 
identify the accident in some way until some further investi-
gation would indicate what took place. 
Q. It was under this policy and all that? 
A. That is the nearest we could come to it. We never did 
receive any information as to how the accident 
page 52~ happened. 
Ql. You did receive from Barker a letter telling 
you that he had been sued~ 
A. That was after the letter of disclaimer-August 23. 
·Q. You got this letter and you wrote him a reply to that? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Please read that letter, dated September 4. 
Letter offered as Exhibit Sweitzer -!-:"3, reading as follows: 
''September 4, 1926 
l\fr. M. Barker 
609 Keen St. 
Danville, V a. 
60 
Dear Sir: 
Supreme Court o.f Appeals of Yirginia. 
A-114327 
Mr. M. Barker, Ass 'd. 
Hettie Davis 'fatal' 
Acknowledg.nient is made of your leter of August 23rd. In 
view of the fact that we disclaimed in the form of a letter 
sent to you under date of July 27th, there is nothing for you 
to do but obtain the services of an <tttorney to give you the 
proper defense at your own expense. 
As stated to you under date of .July 27th, we will not be 
responsible for any defense costs, or 1-"!.Iiy verdict. We have 
closed out our records. · • 
Yours very truly, 
GlS/FC' 1 
(Signed) GASTON I. SWEITZER, 
· Assistant Secretary. 
., 
Q. Hadn't your agents fully in.vestigated this matter and 
advised you that there wasn't the slightest liability? 
. A. Not that I know. of. . 
Q. They did write here in this letter of April 6 and state: 
"We don't think there is any chance of a suit''? 
A. That is probably because of the newspaper clipping. 
The newspaper clipping indicated that Miss Davis was driv-
ing the car. 
Q. Didn't you get that April 9? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. That was written by your agent down here wasn't it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You got this letter? 
. A. Yes. (Read letter to jury dated April 6). 
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Q. You didn't know anything in the world about 
any of the circumstances of the accident? 
A. That is right. . 
Q. You denied liability without knvwing anything about 
it? 
No answer. 
Q. What did you write them? 
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·A. I don't recall the letter I wrote. The agents didn't 
handle our claims. I imagine I turned everything <Qver to 
Messrs. Aiken & Benton. 
Q. Where is your answer to this letter 7 
A. I don't know whether I answered it. 
Q. Where is your file? 
A. Mr. Aiken had the file. 
Q. So you did write them on Aprill5-wrote your agentsf 
A. Yes, sir; we also write to the attorneys. The agents 
did not handle our claims-the attoriliws handled them. The 
agents simply report them. Mr. Harris read letter of April 
15, 1926, and offered it as Exhibit S'weitzer #4. Letter reads 
as follows; 
''Ramey and Ashworth, 
Dudley Building, 
Danville, Virginia. 
April l5, 1926. ,, 
He: M. M. Barker (Policy CA 123..160 
· . H. Davis, Deceased 
Gentlemen; 
Acknowledgment is made of your letter of April 9th. From 
such information as we have on file we see absolutely no re-, 
sponsibility upon the part of our assured. \Ve therefore do 
not see how any valid claim can he made against our as-
:sured. 
Please be referred to our letter of .April 9th in which we 
requested that you turn this case over to our attorneys, Aiken 
and Benton, Esquires. We should :tppreciate yo1,1r having"'' 
our attorneys send in an early report of investigation. L_ 
Yours truly, 
GIS:MKG" Assistant Secretary. 
Q. I want you to look in here in this file and see if you 
haven't got the newspaper clipping that was sent With the 
letter. I want you to compare it with the newspaper clippinef 
that was introduced and see if it isn't the same thing. You 
had that newspaper clipping all the time. 
page 54 }- A. I didn't say I didn't have it. I wasn't sure. 
Q. What does this one say in the headline? 
(Handing witness clipping.) 
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A. Same as· this. 
Q. It is the same article Y A. Yes;· sir. 
Q. The printing is the same 'l 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken~ 
Q. In that letter that Mr. Harris finally read to the jury it 
says: "From such information as we have." Will you state 
what that information was f vVas it tl1e newspaper clipping 
or a statement from Mr. Barker? 
A. It was the newspaper clipping. 
Q. You had not at that time and stili do not have now any 
information from Mr. Barker or anybody~ 
A. No, sir; nobody. 
Q. Ramey & Ashworth-in what capacity do they represent 
your company? 
A. They solicit business. They have nothing to do with 
handling our claims. ·.All claims are referred to our attor-
neys. · 
Q. Do Ramey & Ashworth have any authority to admit lia-
bility or de:u.y liability¥ 
A. No, sir. 
The witness, 
. JESSE W. BENTON, 
being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. Mr. Benton, will you state what your occupation is~­
A. I am a lawyer. 
Q. Yon are a member of the firm of Aiken & Benton?' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is your firm the local counsel in Danville, Virginia, for 
the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will . .you state whetho'.-' you handled the mat-
page 55 }- ter of the claim of Davis's Administrator v .. 
Barker? 
A. Yes, sir; I handled the claim unt of which that arose. 
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Q. When was it lirst called to your attention? 
A. Sometime the first part of April last year. 
Q. How did. you hear about it? . 
A. The company wrote a letter . to the firm asking us to 
investigate the accident. 
Q. Did you make an effort to investigate it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What effort did you mak~? 
A. I called Mr. Barker at his home over the phone several 
times and he wasn't there, and I left word for him to call 
me on one or two occasions and I never could get in touch 
with him, I don't think, at his home, and it went on for sev-
eral days that way and then I went to see Mr. Yarbrough. 
The only information I had about the accident was the ·news-
paper clipplng. It stated in there that Mr. Yarbrough knew 
something about it or was present and I went to see Mr. 
Yarbrough to see if he knew anything about it, and Mr. Yar-
~rough didn't know anything about it, and it turned out that 
Mr. Yarbrough was a friend of Mr. Barker's. 
Mr. Brown objected to evidence ':tS to Mr. Yarbrough be-
ing a friend of Mr. Barker's as immaterial. 
Objection overruled. 
Mr; Brown withdrew objection. 
Q. State what effort you made to get in touch with Mr. 
Barker. 
A. I went to see Mr. Yarbrough and asked Mr. Yarbrough 
what he. knew about the accident, the facts about the acci-
dent. He said nothing except what had been told him. It 
developed that Mr. Barker and Mr. Yarbrough were inti-
mate friends, and I told Mr. Yarbrough when I learned that 
they were friends what I wanted with Mr. Barker, and I 
hadn't been able to g·et Mr. Barker to give me any idea at all 
as to the facts of the accident. I then asked Mr. Yarbrough 
if he would see Mr. Barker and get him to give me the in-
formation that I wanted. 
page 56 ~ Q. Did you ever see Mr. Barker yourselfT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. State the circumstances under which you saw him .. 
A. It was my recollection that it was sometime after that 
on a S'a.turday. . 
Q. About what time of the year? 
A. It was in the month of April. ~Jr. Barker came in my 
office and told me who he was and I said, "Mr. Barker, we 
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represent the insurance company that has your policy and 
the insurance company wants us to ·.nake an investigation of 
the accident and find out the facts as to what happened," 
and he said "vVhat factsf" and I said "vVhat took place" and 
he stood there for some moments and it got to be embar-
rassing. He was shaking and his hands were shaking just 
like he had the palsy, and I said "Well, if the facts as set out 
in the paper are true why you~ can give a statement of that", 
and he said "I don't know about tha'~", and he stood there 
a few minutes and said "Well, I will let you know about it", 
and he left and he didn't come back-- -to my recollection he 
said he would come back. He didn't come back and I found 
out where he was working and went out to Mr. Basil Hara-
way's house on Howeland Circle, and Mr. Barker. was up on 
top of the house working and I called him down to the street 
and he came on to the other side of the street away from the 
house, and I said," Mr. Barker, the insurance company wants 
to know the facts about this accident", and he started to 
shake and he didn't say anything, nnd I said ''They don't 
know how to get along" or somethir~g of that kind, and I 
said "Will you give me a statement~" and he said "I don't 
know", and I said "We have got to have a statement of the 
facts". I then asked him if he would make a statement that 
the newspaper account was correct, and hr again said ''I 
don't know about that". Finally, T ::-aid "You don't want 
to make any statement about it at all "l" and he said, "\:V ell, 
I reckon that is about right". 
Ql. There were two occasions on \Vhich you saw him per-
sonally and he refused to tell you how it happened 1 
A. He didn't tell me. 
Q. Did you tell him you wanted the informa-
page 57 ~ tion 1 
A. Yes, sir; I told him v,re represented the in-
surance company and that they wanted the information. 
Q. You say he became very much excited on every occasion 
in which you talked to him f -
A. Yes, sir; his arms would shake and his hands would 
shake and he would look like a ma-n with the palsy. 
Q. Did you ever get the information fron:>. him 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you ever able to find out how the accident hap-
pened1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you notify the company to that effectf 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. For about how long a time did you make an effort to 
get Barker to tell you this~ 
A. Probably 30 days. I know I was working on it pretty 
.constantly. · . · 
Ql. How many times did you telephone him? 
A. I couldn't say exactly. Some several times. I tele-
phoned his house. I didn't talk to him as I recall over the 
phone. I may have talked to him one time, I can't recall. 
CR-OSS EXAMIN Arl'ION. 
Mr. Brown~ 
Q. Do you recall who you phoned at Mr. Barker's house? 
A. Who I phoned~ 
Q. Yes. · 
A. No, sir; I don't know. It sounded like a young lady's 
voice. 
Q: What telephone 1mmber did yon <'all~ 
A. I think it is in the name of _Miss Huby Barker. 
Q. You didn't talk to Mr. Barker himself on the telephone~ 
A. No, sir-I am not positive. · 
Q. You knew where Mr. Barker lived~ 
A. No, sir; I did not. 
Ql. vVhen you looked in the telephone book and got the num-· 
ber that gave you the residence number didn't it1 
page 58 ~ A. No, sir; I wasn't looking for that. I think 
he lives on Church Street. 
Q. You telephoned over, left word for Mr. Barker to come 
to your office. Is that correct~ 
A. I don't know about that. I left \\rord that I wanted to 
see him or for him to call me. I don't recall exactly. I may 
have said that I wanted him to come to see me or to call me 
up. 
Q. Is there any way whereby you cRn identify the date oiJ 
which you say that your recollection is that Mr. Barker camo 
to your office 1 
A. No, sir; 1 haven't. It was some two or three or fou:r 
weeks. 
Q. Didn't you write the insurance company immediately 
after he came in the office that he left you under the ;impres-
sion that he wasn't going to give yon any information about 
the accident~ 
A. I don't know whether I did or ·not 
Q. About how much longer was it after that that you went 
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to see Mr. Barker while• he was at Mr. Basil Haraway's 
house? · 
A. Probably a week. 
Q. And you asked him for a statement f 
ll. 1res, sir. · · Q. llt the time that you went there you had a file that the 
insurance company had furnished and a newspaper clipping' 
ll. Not in my possession at the time. 
Q. Was it in your office? · 
ll. The company didn't furnish me a file. 
Q. 1r ou did have the newspaper dipping? 
ll. 1r es, sir . 
.Q. llnd the correspondence between your c-ompany and its 
agent? 
ll. I don't know about that. 
Q. So far as any request of Barke1· is concerned, as I un-
derstand you-did you want him to glve you a written state~ 
ment? 
A. I wanted him to. 
Q. 1r ou asked him for a written statement? 
page 59 ~ .A. No, sir. If I could have done so I would 
have prepared one and gotten him to sign it. · I 
would very much have ,preferred a written statement, but I 
. eouldn 't get any kind. 
Q. Didn't you testify before, and isn't it a fact that you 
asked him whether this statement in the newspaper was sub-
stantially correct T 
-A. Yes, sir. 
Q. llnd he told you that it was abtmt as near correct as 
you could get it? 
A. He never did say it was correct. 
Q. Didn't he leave you.under the impression that this state-
ment was substantially correct 7 
ll. No, sir; he did not. He never left me under any im-
pressio;n except that he wanted to say as ~ittle as he possibly 
could. 
(;J. He appeared to be laboring under great mental streRs t 
ll. I don't know what kind it was. 
Q. He was nervous T 
A. Yes. sir; he was nervous. 
Q. llnd he seemed disinclined to talk any moH.' al·out H thau 
he had to? 
.A. He didn't talk at all. 
Q. Did you ca.U his attention to the fact that there was a 
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provision in the policy whereby the dnty waa on him to give 
you a statement and to co-operate with you T. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As I understand you didn't make any independent in-
vestigation of the accident yourself1 
A. Yes, sir; I went to Mr: Yarbrough. 
Q. Outside· of what you stated with reference to Mr. Yar-
brough. ·· 
A. No, sir; I didn't go to see anybody else. 
Q. You didn't go to the scene of the accident T 
A. No,· sir. _ 
Q. And the newspaper account you had said where the ac-
cident happened didn't it-out near Stoney Mills T 
A~ I think it did. 
page 60 }- Q. It said that Mr. B. \V. Dodson-it wa.s near 
the home of Mr. B. W. Dodson, didn't itT 
A. If you will show me the statement I will tell you. 
Q. You didn't go out there yourself and make any inde-
pendent investigation of the accident to determine whether 
the company was liable Y 
A. No, sir; and I would like to tell you why if you would 
like to know. · 
Q. You didn't go to see the people who took them out from 
under the carT 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How many times did Mr. Barker come to your office T 
A. One time. 
Q. You are mistaken about that aren't you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he come with Mr. Yarbrough T 
A. Yes, that is right, he has been there twice. 
Q. He was there twice? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The last time he came he came with Mr. Jess Yarbrough, 
didn't heY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he brought you the notice of the suiU 
A. I don't know about the notice. 
Q. What did they come to see you about? 
A. They came in a:rid I think Mr. Yarbrough ~id the talk-
ing. They gave me to understand that a suit had been brought 
against Mr. Barker and they came to me to protect his in-
terests as· a representative of the insurance company. 
Q. In other wor~s, Mr. Barker came to you with Mr. Yar-
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brough and said that the suit had been brought and that they 
wanted to give you the information 1 
A. One of them said it. 
Q. What did you tell them~ 
A. I told them that the insurance eompany had disclaimed 
liability and were not further intere:;;ied. 
Q\. Did you tell them they had better go orit and get a 
lawyer and do the best th£\Y could~ 
page 61 ~ A. I don ;t think so. I think I told him the com-
pany didn't have anything furthl"'r to do with it. 
Q. After that did Mr. \Vooding come to you and tell you 
that he had been employed by Mr. Barker and that he wanted 
you all to defend him 1 
A. I couldn't tell you about that exactly. Mr. Wooding has 
a funny way of sliding in and talking around and you can't 
tell what he is P.riving at. I think he did probably come to 
see me. 
Q. ""What do you mean by "sliding around" with reference 
to Mr. Wooding? , ·: 
A. I mean he shows up from nowhere and. goes at you so 
easy and you don't know what he is up to. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. Why was it you didn't go out to Stoney Mills~ 
Objection by counsel for plaintiff. 
The judge stated that he couldn't tell what the answer 
would be and whether it was pertinent to the issue or not, 
and that he would have to admit it and then if it was improper 
ask the jury to disregard it. 
A. My understanding is that there were not any actual eye 
witnesses to the accident as it happened, and Barker was the 
only source I had of eye witness, and 1vhen he went hack on 
me I was thru. I wasn't interested ln what Mr. Dodson saw. 
I was interested in the liability at tho time the thing hap-
pened. 
The judge overruled plaintiff's objedion 
To which plaintiff excepted. 
The witness, 
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P. G. RAGLAND, 
being duly sworn, testified as follows; 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. Yoi1 are Commissioner of Revenue of the City of Dan-
ville, are you noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it your duty to take a list of taxable property that 
persons in Danville own~ 
A. It is. 
Q. Do yon know Mr. M. M. Barker~ 
, A. I do.· 
page 62 } Ql. Can you tell us what taxable property he had 
on the last assessment day1 
A. The 1st of February, 19261 
Q. That is the last assessment you have1 
A. That is the last one we made. He had two cars valued 
at $475.00, household furniture $175.00, musical instruments, 
.and $1,117.00 in money. 
Q. What real estate did he own? 
A. He had some real estate, I think, in company with his 
brother-one house and lot. His residence property was in 
the name of his wife. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. Do you know how much money he owed? 
A. I don't know, of course. Yon might have this much 
stuff on the 1st day of February and 011 the 1st day of March 
not have anything. I can't tell about that. 
Q. He might have money in the bank and checks out against 
iU 
A. Yes, sir. That is the official record of his holdings on 
the 1st of February. 
Q. Do you know how much he owed on those two auto-
mobiles? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know whether he was solvent or insolvent~ 
A. Except to this extent. 
Ql. You can't tell whether a nian is insolvent unless you 
put clown the assets on one side and the liabilities on the 
other and subtract can you 7 
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A. That is not my business. 
Q. You don't know a thing about how much the man owed? 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. And it is a fact, isn't it, if Mrs.. Barker owned the fur-
niture in her house, it is a general r.nstom for a man to giv~ 
it in and pay the taxes on it 7 
A. That is sometimes the custom. 
Defendant rests. 
page 63 }- The witness. 'a':.::..') 
HARRY WOODING, 
calle~ in rebuttal for plaintiff, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMIN A'riON. 
Mr. Brown: 
Q. Can you recall about the time that you were first con-· 
nected with this controversy and represented Barker in this 
matter1 
A. I can't recall anything about th9 date. It was a short 
tTme before the suit against Mr. Barker was tried in court. 
Q. When you were first approached by him did you make 
any inquiry as to why the insurance company was not defend-
ing him as their policy required them to do~ 
A. Yes, I asked him about that and he said that the in-
surance company had written him a letter saying they were 
not going to have anything· to do with it. I have a recol-
lection of saying something to Mr. Benton about it. He gave 
me to understand it was not. (Meaning insurance company.) 
Q. Barker therefore employed yon to defend him~ 
A. Employed me to defend him. 
Q. Did you ever have any difficulty in geWng at the exact 
facts7 
A. I didn't have any trouble. Mr. Flynn and myself were 
associated together, and from the beginning I think I knew 
the substantial facts. I filed the gron11ds of defense and took 
charge of the case. 
Q. How much was the suit fod 
A. $10,000.00. 
Q. It develops here from the record that after we had the 
trial-we came in here and the witnesses were all summoned 
-it appears here from the record that the judgment was en-
tered for $4,500.00. Mr. Aiken has stated in his opening state-
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ment that that judgment was obtained thru some sort of fraud 
or collusion. Was!there any such thing of that sort? 
.A. Nothing of the kind. Barker employed me to· defend 
him and I talked it over with Mr. Flynn. I found out that 
they had a suit against Mr. Barker. 1 filed.- the grounds of 
defense and came in court to defend it as best I could. T 
advised· Mr. Barker that he had better settle it if he could. 
Mr. Brown offered to take $4,500.00 in settlement 
page 64 }- and I advised Mr. Barker to take it, because I be-· 
lieved they would get a larger verdict. I thought. 
that was the best way to settle the case and that he ought 
to do it. · 
Q. When we got here that morning all the witnesses were 
here? 
A. The. witnesses all here, everything was ready. The case 
was going to be called that day. It wasn't settled until the 
last minute. 
Q. Was there any reason known to you as counsel for 
Barker that the insurance company ~hould not have been 
present and defended the law suit if they had wanted to 
do so? · · 
A. None in the world. Mr. Benton told me .the insurance 
company had dropped it. He, Barker, paid me a fee to come 
here· and defend him, or a part of a fee. Never have gotten 
all of it. 
GROSS EXAMIN A'fiON. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. He hasn't paid you all of you:::- :fee? 
A. He hasn't paid all of it. 
Q. You say you offered Mr. Brown $4,50([00 and he agreed 
to take it? 
A. I think he made the proposition. 
Q. Has he ·ever gotten the $4,500.00 Y 
A. Not as far as I know. 
Ql. What do you mean he was wimng to take it Y 
A. Take a judgment against BarkPr. 
Q. What difference did it make to Barker whether the judg-
ment was for $4,000 to $9,000 or $10,000 if he didn't expect 
to pay it? 
A. He was taking contracts on buildings. If they jumped 
on him it would make a ·lot of difference. 
Q. Have they ever jumped on him 1 
A. I think they issued an execution. 
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Q. Barker hasn't come to you and wanted you to defend 
him in any garnishment proceedings, has he? 
A. No. , .. 
Q.. It didn't make any difference to him if he didn't expect 
to pay it did iU 
A. He hoped he wouldn't have to pay it, Mr. Aiken. 
Q. This policy was for $5,0001 
page 65 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it anything more than a coincidence that 
you happened to have this agreed verdict for such a close 
figure to the amount of the policy? 
A. I got the verdict down as low qs I could get it. I tried 
to get these gentlemen to take a still lower verdict. 
Q,. This policy protected Barker to the extent of $5,000? 
A. It did. 
Q. He was very liberal with the settlement to that amount? 
A. He wasn't particularly liberal. He· settled that case the 
best he could with these other gentlemen. 
Q. So far as you know they have made no effort to get 
Barker to pay it~ 
A. No, sir; except the execution. 
Q. This execution that has been intt·oduced in court 7 
A. I suppose that is the one. 
The witness, 
J. W. YARBROUGH, 
being recalled for plaintiff, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINArriON. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. We have introduced here a carron copy of the letter 
which I believe I recall at the last trial you testified that you 
wrote. Is that a copy of the letted Did you write iU (Hand-
ing witness letter.) See letter copied MS. 44. 
A. Yes, sir; I wrote that. 
Q. You wrote it for him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did you happen to write it 'l 
A. Mr. Barker came and showed me his papers and I told 
him I thought it was advisable to notify the company. 
Q. You simply did it as a courtesy to Barker7 
A. Sure. 
Q. Yon sent that notice by registered mail, and sent one 
---------------------
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copy to the agent here and one to the company's home of-
fice? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. Did you and Mr. Barker go over to Mr. Ben- -
page 66 } ton's office and offer to r.o-operate with him and 
help him to defend the suiU 
A. I don't know how far that wm1t. We went there with 
that intention, but Mr. Benton cut the l~onversation short and 
.said they were hands off. Sad they had nothing to do with 
it. Said they had gotten a telegram from the company not to 
bother with it any further. 
Q. What did you and Mr. Barker go there for? 
A. To render any .assistance Mr. Benton thought was neces-
sary. 
· Q. You went to him as a lawyer¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had Mr. Barker employed any other counsel at that 
time? 
A. Had not. 
Q. And Mr. Benton told you the insurance company was not 
interested? 
A. Words to that effect. 
,, 
CROSS EXAMIN A'PION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Ql. That was at least a month after the insurance company 
had denied lhibility, 'Wasn't it? 
A. That was the first time they had denied liability to me, 
that telegram. 
Q. You don't deny that the insurance company wrote Mr. 
Barker a letter on July 27, 1926, denying liability, do you? 
A. I don't remember the dates. · 
Q. Would you tell us about when it was that you and Mr. 
Barker went to Mr. Benton's office? 
A. No, sir; I couldn't. . 
Q. Wasn't it in August or early in Septembet? 
A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. It was after July 27, wasn't it? 
A. I couldn't tell you. There is no way in the world to fix 
the dates in my mind. 
Q. Didn't he show you a telegram here at the last trial to 
refresh your memory¥ 
A. It was the same time that telegram was received? 
Q. Wasn't that in September1 
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Q. You knew it then, didn't you? 
A. I haven't the date of the telegl'am. 
Q. What I am trying to do is to arrive at approxiinately 
the time that you went to Mr. Benton's office. 
A. I haven't got anyway in the world to arrive at it ex-
cept from the date of that telegram. 
Q. Handing witness telegram-September 3 ~ 
A. That is the date. 
Q. Was September 3 the date~ 
A. It is the date I think he told me received the telegram 
that morning. 
Q. It was September 3 O·r about that time that you went 
there, five or six weeks after it had been disclaimed~ 
No answer. 
Mr. Harris introduced telegram above referred to, reading 
as follows: Marked as Exhibit Yarbrough #1. 
''150RD R 24 BLUE 
AD PHILADELPHIA PENN 242 P M SEPT 3 1926 
AIKEN & BENTON 
DANVILLE VA 
DAVIS' VERSUS BARKER WE DISCLAIMED UNDER 
DATE JULY T\V'ENTY SEVENTH WE ARE SENDING 
COPY OF THIS LE.TTER TO YOU FOR COMPLETION 
OF YOUR RECORDS 
INDEMNITY INS CO OF N A 
326 P" 
The witness, 
M. M. BARKER, 
being called by counsel for plaintiff, testified as follows~ 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Harris: 
Q. Mr. Barker, in November, 1926, the date that this execu-
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tion for this $4,500 was issued,. did you have any property · 
out of which it could have been collected~ 
A. No, sir. . · 
Q. At any time in 1926 did you have any money 
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lected, any property which it could have been made· 
out o£1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You took out this insurance policy and paid the premium 
on it in good faith did you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When suit was brought against you demanding of you 
this $10,000 damages the policy required that the insurance 
company should defend that suit. Did you go to the insur-
ance company;s lawyers and ask them to defend you~ Did 
you go with Mr. Yarbrough to the ~)ffice of Mr. Benton~ 
A. Yes, sir; I went with him to the office. sometime during· 
the fall of 1926, but I don't remember the exact date. 
Q. Did you go there for the purpose of getting the suit 
defended? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you employed a lawyer at that time~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did they say to you? 
A. I don't remember just the words. He said that he 
wouldn't have nothing to do wi-th it. 
Q. Then, did you employ Mr. "\V" ooding? 
A. Mr. Yarbrough got him for m•?. 
Q. The insurance company here says that you didn't report 
the accident and didn't co-operate with them. Any time you 
ever do anything to refuse to co-operate with them that you 
know of~ 
A. Not intentionally. 
Ql. Do you recall ever going to Mr. Benton's office in the 
Masonic Temple~ · 
A. I didn't except the one time. 
Q. Did Mr. Benton ever come to see you and talk to you 
about it1 
A. On one occasion. 
Q. Where was that~ 
A. On Howeland Circle. 
Q,. Tell us what happen.;cl ~ 
page 69 ~ A. He come out there and said he wanted to see 
· Mr. Barker and I told him I was the man, and I 
went down to see him-I was on top of the house, an.d he 
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· told me he represented the insurance company, I. think, and 
·he asked me about a statement, and of course I didn't know 
exactly what to say to him. He said to make a report like 
it was in the newspaper. He wanted to know if I would sign 
a statement to that effect. I told him I didn't know whether 
I would or not. 
Q. He asked you if that report in the newspaper was about 
right !lnd you told him it was just about as right as you could 
give it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you refuse to give P,im any information that you 
could give him 1 
A. No, sir; that was all that was nsked for by him or any-
body else. 
Q. Did he ever ask you as to who were any witnesses to it, 
or ask you to go out there and help him investigate Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When the suit was brought against you you went with 
Mr. Y arhrough down to his office again~ 
A. That was the first time. 
Q. Were you willing and ready to help him in any way that 
you could~ 
A. Yes, sir; I have been all the time. · 
Q. At any time during this whole matter have you ever 
helped M~. Covington or any of his people to get the judg-
ment against you or aided them in any way~ 
A. No, sir; never spoke to Mr. Covington about it at all. 
Q. Do you reinember getting a letter from the insurance 
company in which they said they denied liability because you 
did not co-operate with them Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do when you got that? 
A. I th~nk if I am not mistaken that Mr. Yarbrough wrote 
the insurance company a letter. I don ~t recall just what was 
in the letter.· I signed the letter of coi1rse, he just wrote it 
for me. , 
Q. He just wrote the letter for you~ 
page 70 ~ . A. Yes, sir. 
you? 
Q!. You haven't got a copy of that letter, have , 
A. I think I have got one at home. 
Q. Do you remember whether this is the one or not Mr. 
Barker? (Handing witness letter of August 23.) 
A. I think so. 
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. H. I. Davis' Adm'r. 77 
Letter introduced .as Barker #1, :reading as follows: 
''Danville, V a., August 23rd, 1926. 
"'Indemnity Insurance Go., of North America, 
Philadelphia. 
Gentlemen: This is to inform you that I have received 
notice of a suit having been filed agai1Jst me on account of a 
fatal accident which occured with my car covered by your 
policy No. CA 123460 d.ated February 12th, 1926 for the term 
.of one year. Y.ou will do what you deem necessary to protect 
your interest in the case. · 
Yours truly 
Copy to Ramey & Ashworth, Agis., 
Danville, V a.'' 
Q. Had you ever seen Mr. Benton before thaftime he came 
out to How eland Circle with reference to this case~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you know him when you saw him¥ . 
A. Well, no, sir ; I don't think I did. Of course if I seen 
him around the courthouse I knew him, but on the street I 
wouldn't have known him. 
Q. He asked you about the facts and you told him that the 
facts as stated in this newspaper clipping were just about 
right¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he asked you if you would s~gn a statement? 
A. I told him I didn't think I would. · 
Q,. What did he say as to that¥ 
A. I don't remember just what he did say, but what he did 
say didn't amount to anything. He drove on away. He didn't 
seem to be pleased or displeased with it as I recollect. 
Q. Do you know of anything that you ever did that kept 
the insurance company from having a full right to 
page 71 ~ investigate all of the facts of the case and to make 
a defense to this suit if they intended to do soY 
Objection to this question as leading. 
After some discussion the objection was withdrawn. 
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Q. Did you ever do anything that hindered them or kept 
them from investigation? 
A. If I did it was not intentionaL It was ignorance if I 
did. I certainly intended to do all that l could. 
Q. How long were you sick after this accident~ You got. 
hurt in the accident-how long was it before you went ·to. 
work? 
A. Something like 10 days or 2 weekR", It was a long time 
before I was able to work. J expect it was. 2 weeks before I 
was able to work. I was able to get c.ut on the street in 2 
weeks. 
Q. How long had you been at work when .Mr. Benton :first 
came to see you 1 
A. I suppose three or four weeks. 
Q. Did it ever come to your attendon-did you ever get 
word from Mr. Bei,Lton to come to see you or anything of that 
sort? 
A. I don't th~nk so. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. Why wouldn't you sign a statemF;nt in writing for Mr~ 
Benton? 
A. Well, sir; I had been advised by some of my friends not 
to sign anything or to tell anything. 
Q. You had---'-why? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You say you were trying to co-operate with this com-
pany. If you ·were trying to help this company what objec-
tion did ·you have to signing a truthful statement~ 
A. RBally I didn't have any objection to it. 
Q. $till you didn't do it~ 
A. I told him I didn't think I w.ould. 
Q. And you didn't 1 
A. I have not yet. 
page 72 ~ Q. You are a contractor. Is that your business f 
A. Sir? 
Q. Is building contractor your bnsi11ess 1 
A. Yes, sir, in a small way. 
The witness, 
OTIS' BRADLEY, 
being called by counsel for defendant, testified as. foliows: 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Aiken: 
Q. I want to ask you whether this case against Mr. Barker 
Qriginally-when they got judgment against Mr. Barker, if 
that wasn't an agreed verdict? 
Mr. Brown objected to this evidence upon the gr-ound that 
the record speaks for itself and upon the further ground that 
even tho there was an agre.ed verdict that it is wholly im-
material and irrelevant so far as the issue here is concerned 
because of the fact that the insurance company on three sepa-
rate and distinct occasions repudiated all liability under the 
policy, abandoning Barker to his own 'lefense. I submit that 
so far as any evidence is concerned after Barker had been 
abandoned by the insurance company, as to what he did in 
reference to defending himself or wh~t his counsel did, is 
wholly beside this issue, bec~use they have waived their right 
to object to anything he did after. that time. · 
The judge said that Mr. Wooding had testified about the 
way the verdict was arrived at and that he understood the 
questioning was along this line and unless the testimony 
varies or eop.tradicts the record he didn't see any objection 
to it. He overruled the objection. 
To which plaintiff excepted and saved the point. 
. A. The judgment was entered up by consent, s~gned by the 
Jury. 
Q. Signed by the jury without goillg out of the room? 
A. I would not be positive that they went out of the room. 
I think they did. 
CROSS EXAMIN.A. TION. 
Mr. Harris : 
Q. What is your definition of a consent. Vt.:!rdicU 
A. When two lawyers get together and agree as to what 
the verdict is to be a.nd they write it out on the papers. _ 
Q. If a man sues another for $10,000 and they can compro-
mise for $1,000, it isn't a question of whether he consented is 
it? He had to consent, 'didn't he? 
A. No. . 
· Q\. You don't remember whether the jury went 
page 73 ~ out or not? 
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A. I don't remember. 
Q. I want you to read the record. 
A. That is just a form order. 
Q. As a matter of fact they did go out in this case~ 
A I think they did, but I wouldn't say positively. 
End of testimnoy. 
Teste: March 22, 1927. 
A. D. DABNEY, Judge. 
EXHIBIT 'WOODING J. 0. #1. 
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INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO_MPANY OF NORTH 
AMERICA 
Philadelphia 
A Stock Company 
(Hereinafter called the Company) • 
HEREBY AGREES WITH THE ASSURED 
Named in the Declarations attached hereto and hereby made 
a part hereof, as respects bodily injuries (or death resulting ~ 
· at any time therefrom) and property damage accidentally 
suffered or alleged to have been suffnred by any person or 
persons during the term of this Policy, resulting from the 
ownership, maintenance or use, inclnding loading or unload-
ing, of any of the automobiles described in the Declarations, 
at any location within the United States of America or the 
Dominion of Canada, and also as respects direct loss or dam-
age to any such automobile or automobiles when accidentally 
sustained within said territorial limits, as follows: 
S'ection A-Public Liability. Provided specific premium 
charge is made in Section A, Item 1, of the Declarations: · 
TO PAY, within the limits specified in the Declarations, 
any loss by reason of the liability imposed by law upon the 
Assured for such bodily injuries or death so reslilting; 
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TO DE:FEND, in the name and on behalf of the Assured, 
all claims or suits for such injuries for which the Assured is, 
or is alleged to be, liable; 
TO PAY all costs and expenses incurred with the Com-
pany's written.consent; 
TO PAY all court costs taxed against the Assured in any 
such suit; 
TO PAY ~11 interest accruing upon any judgment in any 
:such suit up to the date of the payment or tender to the judg-
ment creditor, or his attorney of record, of the amount for 
which the Company is liable,; 
\ 
TO REPAY to the Assure<;l the expense incurred in provid-
ing such immediate surgical relief as is imperative. at the 
time of the accident. 
. 
Section B-Property Damage. Provided specific premium 
charge is made in Section B, Item 1, of the Declarations: 
TO 'PAY, within the limits specified in the Declarations, 
any loss by reason of the liability imposed by law upon the 
Assured for such damage or destruction of property of every 
description (excluding property of the Assured or property 
in the custody of the Assured for which the Assured is legally 
responsible, or property carried in or upon any automobile 
of the Assured, including lass of use of such property dam-
aged or destroyed : 
TO DEFEND, in the name and on behalf of the Assured, 
all claims or suits for such damage for which the Assured is, 
or is alleged to be, liable: 
TO PAY all costs and expenses incurred with the Com-
pany's written consent; 
TO PAY all court costs taxed against the Assured in any 
such suit; 
TO PAY all interest accruing upon any judgment in any 
such suit up to the date of the payment or tender to the judg-
ment creditor, or his attorney of record, of the amount fo1 
which the Company is liable. 
·' 
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Section C-Collision. Provided specific premium charge 
is ~ade in Section Ct Item 1~ of the Declarations: 
TO PAY to the Assured the actual loss incurred during the 
term of tpis Policy, not exceeding the adual cost of suitable 
repair or replacement, by reason of damage to. or destruction 
of any automobile or automobiles described herein, including 
operating equipment while attached thereto, if c-aused solely 
by accidental collision with another object, either moving or 
stationary, excluding, however, damage or destruction by fire 
. from any cause whatsoever. 
It is agreed that the amount deductible as stated in Section 
C, Item 1, of the Declarations shall be deducted in the case 
of every collision from the amount of damage sustained. 
THIS AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOW-
ING CONDITIONS: 
' Additional As:surecl. 
A. It is hereby understood and agreed, unless limited by 
endorsement attached hereto, that thii3 Policy is extended to 
cover as additional Assured any person or persons while rid-
ing in or legally operating any automobile described in the 
Declarations and any person, firm or corpontion, legally re-
sponsible for the operation thereof (excepting always a pub-
lic garage, automobile repair shop and/or sales agency and/or 
service station and agents and employes thereof), provided 
such use or operation is with the pormission of the named 
Assured or, if the named Assured is vn individual, with the 
permission of an adult member of the Assured's household 
other than a chauffeur or domestic srrvant; but in no event 
shall the·extension of insurance herein provided be considered 
to apply to an automobile operated for the transportation of 
pa.ssengers for hire, or to cover the purchaser of any au-
tomobile described herein if sold, or a transferee or assignee 
of this Policy except by the direct r-onsent of tlie Company 
in the manner indicated in Condition H of this Policy. 
Limitation of Liability 
B. The liability of the Company uncl..;r this Policy is limited 
as expressed in Item 1 of the Declarations, which limits shall 
apply however to each automobile covered hereunder, and 
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the limits shall not apply to the cost of defense of claims or 
suits, court costs, interest accruing upon any judgment as 
above limited or the cost of immediate surgical relief, as 
provided for herein. 
Exclusions 
C. This Policy shall not cover in respect of any automo-
bile: (1) while driven or manipulated in any race or speed 
test; (2) while driven or manipulated by any person under 
the age fixed by law or under the age of sixteen yeats in any 
event; (3) while being used for towing or propelling any 
trailer or' any vehicle used as a trailer. This Policy does not 
cover: (a) any liability of the Assured to any employe of the 
Assured while engaged in the maintenance or use of any au-
tomobile; (b) any liability voluntarily assumed by the As-
sured; (e) any liability imposed by any workmen's compen-
sation law or agreement; (d) any loss under Section C of this 
Policy resulting from damage to· or destruction of any ttre 
due to puncture, cut, gash, blowout, or other ordinary tire 
trouble and excluding in any event damage to or destruction 
of tires unless caused by an accidental collision which also 
causes other damage to or destruction of the insured auto-
mobile. 
Notice and Settlement 
. D. In the event of accident, the Assnred shall give prompt . 
written notice thereof to the Company or to one of its duly 
authorized agents, and (1) forward to the Company forthwith . 
after receipt thereof every process, plP.ading or paper of any 
kind relating to any and all claims, suits or proceedings. rrhe 
Assured shall at all times render to the Company all co-opera-
tion and assistance in his power and, whenever requested, 
shall aid in securing information and evidence and the at-· 
tendance of witnesses and in prosecuting appeals. The Assured 
shall make no settlement of any claim arising hereunder nor 
incur any expense other than for inunediate surgical relief 
. without the written consent of the Company. The Company 
shall have the right· to settle any claim or suit at its own cost 
Appraisal 
at any time. (2) In tl1e event of disagreement as to the ex-
tent of damage to or destruction of a'1Y insured automobile 
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the loss may be determined by two appraisers, one chosen 
by the Assured aiJ.d one by the Company. The two appraisers 
if unable to agree may select a third. The award in writing 
of two appraisers shall determine the loss, damage or re-
pairs. The Company and the Assured shall pay the apprais-
ers respectively selected by each and shall bear equally the 
other expenses of the appraisal and of the third appraiser if 
one is selected. The Company may accomplish any repairs 
determined by the appraisers by such means as it may se-
lect, or, at the option of the Company, may replace the auto-
mobile (or its equipment) or pay in money the amount of loss 
or damage determined by the appraisers. The Company shall 
have reasonable time and opportunity to examine any dam-
aged automobile (or its equipment) before repairs are under-
taken or physical evidence of the damage is removed, but the 
Assured shall not be prejudiced by ftllY act on his part or in 
his behalf undertaken for the protection or salvage of the 
damaged automobile (or its equipment). 
Cancellation 
E. This Policy may be cancelled at any time at the request 
of the Assured, or by the Company, upon written notice to 
the other party, stating when thereafter cancellation shall 
become effective, and the date of cancellation shall then be 
the end of the Policy period. If such caiwellation is at the 
Company's request, the earned premium sh::tll be computed 
and adjusted pro rata. If such cancellation is at the Assured's · 
request, the earned premium shall be computed and adjusted 
at short rates, in accordance with the table printed hereon. 
Notice of cancellation mailed to the address of the Assured 
as given herein shall be a sufficient notice, and the Company's 
check, similarly mailed, a sufficient tender of any unearned 
premium. 
Special Statutes 
F. If any of the terms or conditions of thjs Policy conflict 
with the law of any State in which coverage is granted, such 
conflicting terms or conditions shall -Ce inoperative in such 
State in so far as they are in conflict with such law. Any 
specific statutory provision in force in any State in which 
coverage is granted shall supersede any condition of this 
Policy inconsistent therewith. 
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.Subrogation 
G. The Company shall be suhrogntJd in case of any pay-
ment under this Policy, to the extent of such payment, to all 
the Assured's rights of recovery therefor against any party 
or other entity. · 
Assignment 
H. No assignment of interest under this Policy shall bind 
the Company unless its consent shall t·e endorsed hereon. 
Changes 
I. No <Jondition or provision of this Policy shall be waived 
or altered, except by endorsement attached hereto, signed by 
the President, a Vice-President, Secretary or an Assistant 
Secretary of the Company, nor shall knowledge possessed by 
.any Agent or by any other person be held to effect a waiver 
or change in any part of this contract. Changes in the writ-
ten portions of the Declarations may be made by the Agent 
countersigning this Policy, such changes binding the Company 
when initialed or signed by such Agent. 
Bankruptcy 
J. In the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the As-
sured, the Company shall not be released from the payment 
of such indemnity hereunder as would have been payable but 
for such bankruptcy or insolvency. If, because of such bank-
ruptcy or insolvency an execution against the Assured is re-
turned unsatisfied in an action brought by the injured, or by 
another person claiming by, through or under the injured, 
then an action may be maintained by the injured, or by such 
other person against the Company under the terms of this 
Policy for the amount of the judgment in said action, not ex-
ceeding the amount of this Policy. 
Acceptance 
K. The Assured by the acceptanc13 of thi8 Policy declares 
the several statements in the Declarations to be true, and 
this Policy is issued in consideration thereof and of the pay-
ment of the premium. · 
S6 Supreme...Court of .1\ppeals of Virginia. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the INDEMNITY INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA has caused this 
Policy to be signed by its President and Secretary at Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania, and countersigned. by a duly author-
ized Agent of the Company. 
BENJAMIN RUSH. President. 
R. W. FORSYTH, Secretary. 
Countersigned: 
RAMEY & ASHWORTH, INC. 
By R. H. RAMEY, 
S'ec 'y & Treas. 




Policy No. CA. 123460 
Issued at 
RAMEY & ASHWORTH, INC .. 
Old Policy No ....... . 
INDEMNITY INSURANCIC COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA 
Philadelphia, Pa. 
·DECLARATIONS 
The Company shall be liable onbr under that section or 
those sections of the Policy for which a specified premium 
charge is made hereunder. 
Section A. Liability for Bodily Tnjnries or Death-Limit 
one person, Five thousand dollars ($5,000): Limit one acci-
dent, Ten thousand Dollars ($10,000); Premium, $12.00. 
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. Section B. Liability for Damage to Property of .others: 
Limit any one accident~ One thouiland Dollars ($1,000); 
Premium, $7.00. · 
Section C. Collision-Damage to Automobile Insured-A-c-
tual value in excess· of, Not Covered Dollars (Nil), Pre-
(Deductible) 
mium, Nil. 
Total Premium, $19.00. . J 
Item 2. The name of Assured is Mr. M. Barker. 
Item 3. The address of Assured is 609 Keen Street, Dan-
ville, Va. 
Item 4. ·The Assured's occupation or business is Carpenter. 
Item 5. The Policy period shall be 12 months, beginning on 
the 12tli day of Feb., 192·6, 12 :01 a. m., and ending on the 12th 
day of Feb., 1927, 12 :01 a. m., standard time, at the place 
where the Policy has been countersigned, 
Item 6. The automobiles covered by this Policy and the 
premium charges for same are as follows: 
Trade Name, Essex; Factory Number, Ser. 1360933, Mot 
1378436; Style of Body, Roadster; Model and Year Built, 
1925; Date Purchased New or Second Hand, Sec. Han Feb. 
1926.' . 
Item 7. The automobiles covered hereby are and will be 
principally used in the city or town (and its vicinity) of Dan-
ville, v~. 
Item 8. The automobiles covered hereby are and will be 
used only for the following purposes: Private & Business. 
Item 9. None of the automobiles herein described are ol' 
will be rented to others or used to earry passengers for a 
consideration during the period of this Policy. 
Item 10. No company has cancelled or refused to issue any 
kind of automobile insurance for the .L\.ssured during the past 
three years, except as follows : No r>xceptions. 
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Item .11. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: The following con-
dition is hereby made a part of this Policy and acknowledged 
and warranted by the Assured to be true in consideration of 
a reduction in the rate charged for the insurance under the 
SECTION to which such condition applies, provided the ques-
tion in regard to such condition is herein answered "yes". 
1. Will the Assured, at all times during the life of the 
policy, keep the insured automobile equipped with a (Front 
and/or Rear) Nil. 
bumper known as (Name) Nil 
manufactured QY Nil 
and use due diligence and care in maintaining the efficiency 
of said bumper¥ 
1732-T-6-5-25-Liability 
AUTOMOBILE POLICY 
Expires February 12th, 1927, 12.01 A. M. 
Premiums 
Liability for Bodily Injuries or Death .............. $12.00 
Property Damage to Property of Oth:3rs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.00 
Collision Damage to Automobile Insured. . . . . . . . . . . . nil 
Total Premiums .............................. $19.00 
Assured, Mr. M. M. Barker. 
No. CA 123460. 
INDEMNITY INSURANCFJ COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA 
Philadelphia 




Dudley Bldg. D:mville, Va. 
PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY 
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S'tate of Virginia, 
City of Danville, To-wit: 
I, Otis Bradley, Clerk of the Corporation Court of Danville, 
do hereby certify that the foregoing iB a true transcript of, 
.so much of the record and judicial proeeedings of said Court 
as I have been directed to copy in a certain Notice of Motion 
to recover judgment, lately pending in said Court between 
John A. Covington, Administrator ,Jf Hettie I. Davis, de-
ceased, plaintiff, and Indemnity Insurance Company of North 
America, Philadelphia, defendant. 
And I further certify that the defendant has filed with me 
a written notice to the plaintiff of its intention to apply for 
.a transcript of said record, which notice has been duly ac-
cepted by Harris, Harvey & Brown, Attorneys for said plain-
tiff. 
Given under my hand this the 30th day of March, 1927. 
OTIS BRADLEY, Clerk. 
Clerk's Fee for Copy of Record, $85.00. 
A Copy~Teste: 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. G. 
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